Social Change and Family Dependency in Old Age : Perceptions of Japanese Women in Middle Age

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C O N T E N T S

T A B L E S

F I G U R E S

A B S T R A C T

Massive postwar change could be expected to have had major impacts on intergenerational exchange in Japan. This paper draws on the Mainichi national fertility surveys to analyze the ways in which views on dependence on children in old age have changed as married Japanese women passed through mid-life during the postwar years. The women's expectations of family support in their old age were found to fall rapidly as options for retirement income improved in the early 1960s. Change was led by the expanding middle classes, emergent cohorts and other groups at the forefront of social change but gaps between generations and social positions appear to have narrowed over recent decades. Adherence to the norm of filial support, however, remained consistently strong over the years. It varied little between social groups, and changed primarily through the succession of cohorts having more modern conceptions of personal obligations to parents. Expectations for family support in old age were influenced by both prevailing social conditions and maturation but norms of family support remained stable through mid-life. The findings show the adaptability of cultural beliefs concerning intergenerational exchange and the influence of life-span progression, cohort succession, and social structural change on those beliefs.

I. Introduction

Social change has wrought major changes in the support patterns of older people throughout the world during the postwar era. Japan, in particular, has experienced unparalleled pressure for social adaptation to rapid economic development, population aging, urbanization and westernization. Over the passage of less than two generations, the traditional reliance of older people on continued productivity and coresident children has been augmented by increased savings from mid-life and support from government. Japan would appear to present an outstanding case for examining the consequences of social change on generational relations.

In times of rapid societal development, the social milieu in which filial obligations are learned in childhood can be very different from those in which family support may be provided in mid-life or received in old age. The succession of cohorts through the generations in families brings about further change. Important questions emerge regarding the interrelationship between structural and cultural change, the stability or adaptability of attitudes over the life course, and the possible emergence of "generation gaps" and broken "intergenerational contracts."

This paper reports findings on young and middle-aged married women's personal expectations for family support in old age and their adherence to norms of filial support for older people. It examines the ways in which these views may have changed among successive cohorts of women passing through middle age during the postwar period in Japan. These women "in the middle" (Brody, 1981) play a pivotal part in exchanging support with older parents, inculcating family values in children, and setting their own plans for old age.

The primary information source is a series of national fertility surveys conducted biannually betweeen 1950 and 1986 by the Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi newspapers. The samples consist of approximately 3,000 women who were married and in the reproductive years up to 50 years of age at the time of each survey. The questionnaires included measures of personal expectations for support in old age (1950-86) and norms of filial support (1963-1986). The time-series data show the influence on attitudes of cohort succession, maturation, and periods of history. Additional information is

presented on the changing social conditions and structures in which the expectations and norms were formed and possibly changed. The results thus aim to inform some aspects of what Riley (1987, p.1) has termed the central analytical framework for a sociology of age: ". . . the interplay between human lives and changing social structures."

The main thesis of the paper is that personal expectations for family support in old age would be influenced by changing life-cycle positions through adulthood as well as widening alternatives through self provision and the public sector. It is expected that deeply seated filial norms would evolve slowly, primarily as a result of the succession into adulthood of cohorts raised in a progressively more modern Japan. Although Japan is a relatively homogeneous society, it is expected that the attitudinal changes would have developed first among particular groups having greater exposure to social change and then would have diffused to other social groups. Finally, it is expected that consistency between norms and expectations would have been maintained through the evolution of new patterns of intergenerational support.

The paper begins by reviewing concepts on intergenerational support, adult socialization, and social change. The discussion then turns to traditional Japanese patterns and values concerning filial support of the aged and the postwar societal changes which could have affected them. After outlining the information source and analytical approaches, results are presented on changes of expectations for filial support in old age, changes of norms underlying its provision, and changes in the congruence between these expectations and norms. The conclusion considers the implications of the findings for theories of intergenerational relations, adult socialization and social change.

II. Intergenerational Exchange, Filial Norms and Social Change

A. Intergenerational Exchange

In nearly all societies, the ties between parents and children provide a central avenue for redistributing resources over the life cycle (Kendig, Hashimoto, and Coppard, forthcoming). In developed

Western societies, the predominant pattern of family support has been termed "serial, intergenerational reciprocity" (Sussman, 1976), because the flow of support generally flows downwards throughout adult life to each ascendant generation. With income support and long-term care now being the primary responsibility of the nuclear family and government, only a minority of older people receive high levels of support "up" the generations from an adult child. In Australia, for example, the receipt of substantial filial support in old age has been found to have little relationship to previous care of one's own older parents, previous support to an adult child, or emotional closeness between parents and adult children (Kendig, 1986).

Values and norms structure the responsibilities of the middle generation (usually daughters) in providing substantial support to parents should it become necessary in their old age (Sussman, 1976; James, James, and Smith, 1984). These beliefs and moral prescripts, with reinforcements through guilt and social pressure, are particularly important in structuring noneconomic exchanges having unpredictability of needs and "goods," long time frames and uncertain reciprocity between individuals (Kendig, 1986). The linkage between normative beliefs and actual behavior is complex and varies depending on the perspectives and circumstances of the involved parties and negotiations between them (Marshall, Rosenthall, and Daciuk, 1987; Mutran and Reitzes, 1984).

B. Socialization

Brody, Johnson, Fulcamer and Lang (1983) have shown that the norms of family support diverge between generations of American women. The middle generation, as compared to the old one, is more likely to see family support as a matter of obligation than repayment or exchange. Also, this generation is more likely to set limits on obligations to support aged parents when they conflict with competing responsibilities to spouses, children and employment. Perhaps suprisingly, the third generation of women, granddaughters generally in early adulthood, appears to have stronger beliefs in filial obligations than does the middle generation.

A later study compared these American findings to those for older women and their daughters-in-law (the primary caregivers) and grand-

daughters in Japan (Campbell and Brody, 1985). The overall findings and generational differences were remarkably similar to those for the United States, notwithstanding cultural differences and the predominance of multigenerational households in the Tokyo sample. Adherence to norms of filial obligation was found to be stronger among the American women, and involve more affection, but their support for aged parents was more likely to be conditional. Interpretation of these results requires considerable caution because, as will be shown below, the demands of meeting filial obligations would be much greater in Japan than in the United States.

The cross-sectional studies reported by Brody and her colleagues cannot explain attitudinal differences between the generations. The possibilities include the positions of the women along the life course at the time or in the social milieu in the past when each generation was socialized (Bengtson, Cutler, Mangen, and Marshall, 1985). Much of the literature on socialization suggests, but provides little reliable evidence, that core family values and gender roles are fixed in childhood and change very little thereafter (Chodorow, 1978). Sear's (1981) review of social and political attitudes suggests that views generally are resistant to change as they become increasingly reinforced by inertia, practice and identity over the life span. This notion of "fixity" of attitudes with individual development would suggest that social values would change initially among the young and progress further through cohort succession (Ryder, 1965). It would widen generation gaps in times of rapid change.

Life course theorists (Kiesler, 1981; Hagestad and Neugarten, 1985) posit greater scope for attitudinal change through adulthood in response to new social conditions and changing life-cycle positions. For example, adult children have been found to influence, as well as to be influenced by, their parents' ideological beliefs (Glass, Bengtson, and Dunham, 1986). The "change-proneness" of attitudes probably is heavily influenced by the "object" or behavior in question, cognitive processes by which people maintain consistency in their life, and passage through social statuses which require resocialization and expose people to social change (Glenn, 1980; Dannefer, 1984). If development and socialization can continue throughout life, it is important to identify the variety of age-graded, sociocultural, event-specific and historical factors which influence both personal and social change (Featherman and Learner, 1985).

C. Social Change

There are few studies in gerontological literature assessing the effect of social change on the patterns and norms of intergenerational support. Little is known about the ways in which cultural norms and values concerning aging and families may lag behind, contradict with, or actively shape new patterns of economic and social organization (Riley, 1987; Harris, 1983).

Kiesler (1981) draws on psychological literature to suggest ways in which social change may influence attitudes towards older people and expectations for old age. She argues that most social change is brought about by economic and demographic developments which generally are exogenous to individual motives and attitudes concerning aging. Structural change is said to lead to behavioral change which in turn reshapes motivations and expectations. Attitudinal change is posited to follow as individuals minimize cognitive dissonance between beliefs and behavior. Attitudes also can change through exposure to new information, with the extent of change depending on prior attitudes and the salience of the issue. These theoretical insights can apply to changes brought about by both individual aging and social change.

The modernization thesis of Cowgill and Holmes (1972; see also Cowgill, 1986) provides one of the few generalized treatises on the impact of societal development on older people. The central argument is that the status and support of the aged are undermined by the social changes introduced by new technologies. The power and authority of the aged are said to be eroded as new cohorts entering adulthood control emergent forms of knowledge and economic production. It is claimed that urbanization and social differentiation separate generations and break down traditional social controls. The value of older people is said to be reduced as respect for tradition lapses and the burden of supporting more older people increases.

Cross-sectional comparisons between "traditional" and "modern" societies lend some support to the modernization propositions in terms of the relative, if not absolute, position of older people (Palmore and Manton, 1974). Gilleard and Gurkan (1987) review more recent evidence and show that cohort succession and economic development appear to have undermined the position of older men as household heads in Turkish villages. However, there is great variability in the

processes of social change, and both cultural and historical contexts are crucial in mediating their impacts (Fry, 1988; Kendig, Hashimoto, and Coppard, in progress).

Countries at more advanced stages of development appear to have improved their "treatment" of the aged during recent decades (Palmore and Manton, 1974; Keith, 1985; Fry, 1988). In the United States, the incomes of successive cohorts of older people, relative to younger people, were maintained over the postwar years and increased from 1967 to 1977 (Harris, 1986). From 1962 to 1975, a time of rapid expansion of public programs, family support of older people continued to be strong (Shanas, 1979). Coresidency with children declined slightly, however, as the financial means to maintain separate households increased and alternative residential care became more readily available.

There is very little evidence that societal development breaks down norms of respect and support for older people. Bengtson, Dowd, Smith, and Inkeles (1975) found that, in a cross-sectional study of young men in six developing countries, perceptions of obligations due to the elderly did not vary systematically according to the level of modernization of the country. Within each of the countries, exposure to the forces of modernization (as indicated by occupation) also showed no systematic association with adherence to these norms.

In the United States, Okraku (1987) found that attitudes towards multigenerational households have become more favorable among all cohorts from 1973 to 1983. He confirmed Brody et al.'s (1983) finding of the more positive views of relatively younger adults towards multigenerational households. He also found that conditional support for coresidency increased among the very old, suggesting attitudinal adjustment to necessity and self-interest. The changes associated with aging and generational position generally were greater than those across periods of history or between cohorts. Hagestad (1981) has suggested that family relations in developed societies remain strong but are becoming more voluntary than obligatory and more expressive than instrumental.

D. Summary

The literature on intergenerational support of the aged suggests

a number of likely influences on the formation and change of norms and patterns of family support for older people. The findings of nearly all available studies, however, have fundamental limitations. Cross-sectional comparisons of age groups shed little light on the life course progression of cohorts through different periods of history. Cross-national comparisons cannot show the influence of varied patterns of development within particular cultural contexts. There is great potential (and difficulty) in interrelating microprocesses of human development to macroprocesses of social change (Maddox, 1979; Riley, 1987).

III. Social Change in Postwar Japan

A. Historical Context

Modernization in Japan differed significantly from the earlier European experience. Industrialization occurred rapidly and selectively as national elites in the 19th century imported the industrial means of defending Japan and its culture (Benedict, 1946). Modernization was to a large extent directed and controlled by a political and economic structure which had long incorporated strong reinforcement of duties to elders (Bellah, 1957, cited in Giele, 1982). These legacies suggest that industrialization in Japan may have largely been incorporated into, or coexisted with, a traditional way of life and its social order.

The social position of older Japanese and related values have their origins in a peasant economy. Family values evolved from Confucian beliefs in the "ie"--the ongoing household with successive generations of parents, eldest sons, and their wives and children (Sano, 1958; Fukate, 1981; Palmore and Maeda, 1985). The daughter-in-law held a subordinate position when she came to the household controlled by her mother-in-law and the property controlled by her father-in-law. In contrast to the general veneration of elders and broader family obligations of Chinese society, Japanese family relations are concentrated on intense obligations between individuals in direct lineal descent within stem families. These family patterns have been reinforced by primogeniture inheritance and the Meiji regime's Civil Code.

Family values in Japan also are reinforced by what Benedict (1946) termed a "shame culture" involving a deep sensitivity to social approval. There is an overriding motivation throughout life to relieve the great burden of carrying an indebtedness to others, termed "on;" the obligation of "gimu," (to repay limitless indebtedness); and "oya-koko," (the absolute duties to parents). The authority of parents is part of a general orientation toward hierarchies between superiors and inferiors in all relationships. Moreover, Japanese moral prescripts are highly situationally specific, which suggests considerable cultural capacity for movement of values in one sphere of life without any necessary change of other and possibly contradictory beliefs.

B. Postwar Change

An extraordinarily rapid demographic transition has been one of the many postwar changes possibly influencing Japanese attitudes and practices of family support in old age (Kuroda and Hauser, 1981). Life expectancy of women rose from 51 years in 1951 to 80 years in 1986 (Ogawa, 1987). With low birth rates and little immigration, the proportion of the population aged 65 years or over rose from 5 to 10 percent over the postwar years and is projected to rise to 16 percent by the year 2000 and nearly 25 percent by 2020 (Ogawa et al., 1986). Women in successive cohorts would have been increasingly likely to have an aged mother-in-law in mid-life and to have had firm expectations of surviving to old age themselves.

Postwar Japan has experienced an unparalleled transformation of the means of production. The proportion of workers who were self-employed or in family businesses declined from 59 percent in 1950 to 29 percent in 1980 (Ogawa, 1986). Over this same period of history, the proportion of workers in primary industries fell from 49 to 11 percent, and the proportions rose in secondary industries from 22 to 34 percent, and in tertiary industries from 30 to 55 percent. These changes would have decreased reliance of ascendant generations on family capital, and would have presented highly valued occupations to new cohorts entering adulthood. Although older workers have benefitted from continuing age-grading of both incomes and positions, most individuals probably need to complete savings for retirement by age 55

years when employees typically retire from their main jobs and take on less well-paid positions (Martin and Ogawa, 1984). The increase of married women's employment rates, now at levels comparable to those in the United States (Campbell and Brody, 1985), would have increased capacitites for savings in mid-life while limiting prospects for providing coresident care to aged parents.

The economic miracle of postwar Japan has improved the financial capacities of people in mid-life to save for their own old age and to support the older generation at the same time. After the abject poverty of the early postwar years, the economy developed slowly in the 1950s, grew at an astounding 11 percent annually through the 1960s, and settled into steady growth of about 5 percent in the early 1970s (Ogawa and Suits, 1983). The oil crisis of 1973, however, resulted in a year of negative growth which profoundly shook Japanese confidence in the future. A growth rate of 5 percent was recovered quickly, although it has receded to approximately 2 percent over recent years. The fluctuating economic base and its uncertain future may have influenced expectations for support in old age.

Urbanization has been a necessary concomitant of industrialization. The proportion of the population in urban areas rose rapidly from 37 percent in 1950 to 76 percent in 1980 (Ogawa, 1986). This would have separated some young and middle-aged people from the households of older parents, and possibly lessened the moral pressures applying in traditional rural communities. However, many eldest sons remained in their parents' homes while younger sons migrating to cities were establishing their own stem families. Once people gain employment in an urban area, mobility typically is low in Japan but it is rising. Group pressure in work circles and the strong ward system within cities may have provided alternatives to village life in reinforcing social values.

Another key aspect of the transformation of the labor force--and possibly values--has been changing educational practice. Prewar education had aimed to inculcate traditional family beliefs and "selflessness" (Lebra, 1979). Postwar schools apparently placed more emphasis on modern values, and children may have turned more to schools than to older people for knowledge and values appropriate to the new economic era (Sano, 1958). The changes in educational practices combined with increasing educational attainment, potentially

could have widened generation gaps in beliefs concerning family obligations.

C. Government Intervention

Public policies generally follow rather than lead economic and social change. In the case of Japan, however, some policies apparently were implemented in order to change traditional family practices and values. For example, revisions of the Civil Code in 1948 and the postwar constitution removed the legal sanctions behind the primary powers of family heads over arranged marriages and primogeniture inheritance (Sano, 1958). At the same time, continuity was reaffirmed by Article 730 which stated that "relatives who share a residence are obliged to assist each other" (ibid, p. 30). These changes apparently were designed to reshape traditional culture to better align with a more modern social structure consonant with individual rights and economic advancement.

Government involvement with income support in old age did not begin until economic development was firmly established. From the late 1950s through the early 1960s, most workers were brought into the Employee Pension Insurance Plan or similar contributory (subsidized) plans which would provide payments based on levels and years of contributions (Social Insurance Agency, 1985). In 1961 modest, non-contributory payments were provided through the Old Age Welfare Pension Plan as a transitional arrangement for those not covered by other plans. The household-based means tests for this pension reflected cultural beliefs that family rather than government was considered the first recourse for support of the aged (Hashimoto, 1984). Not until 1970 was a contributory plan introduced for self-employed farmers. In 1973, just a few months before the oil crisis, pensions were increased appreciably in real value and were indexed to future rises in the cost of living.

The most significant developments in health and welfare services occurred basically at three times (Social Insurance Agency, 1985). In 1958, the introduction of National Health Insurance extended partial reimbursement for medical expenses to retirees who were not covered as either former members in employer insurance plans or dependents of current members. In 1972, virtually full health-care coverage was

extended, with household means tests, to older people not covered by other plans. With rising concern in the 1980s over capacities to meet the costs of population aging, a small charge for use of health care was introduced for older people in 1983. This was a widely publicized reversal of the earlier trend towards increasing public subsidies for older people.

Some community and residential care services are covered by insurance plans, or subsidized by government, but these services until recently have been very limited (Maeda and Shimizu, forthcoming). Public subsidies generally have been directed to those without family or having high levels of dependency. Less than 2 percent of older Japanese now live in residential care.

These various policy developments would have had far-reaching implications for intergenerational relations. Most significantly, the balance in the provision of income support for the aged has been shifting from families to the public sector. Those who would be in the contributory pension plans for sufficient time would have had predictability of retirement income independent of families. The noncontributory pension plans, however, were not large enough to provide full alternatives to income support from family. Public alternatives to coresident family care, in the event of chronic disability, remained extremely limited, notwithstanding increases over the 1980s.

D. Household Structure and Intergeneration Support

Levels of family support for older people appear to have fallen slightly in Japan from the very high levels of the early postwar years. The proportion of older people who lived with a child remained constant through the 1950s and then fell steadily from approximately 87 percent in 1960 (Palmore and Maeda, 1985) to 65 percent in 1985 (Maeda and Shimizu, forthcoming). However, with the rapid growth of the older population, there has been a rise in the proportion of multigenerational households (Morgan and Hirosima, 1983). Coresidency is preferred by most older people and it has provided substantial support from younger to older generations. Nearly half of the aged now receive some financial support from adult children, usually through coresidency, and the vast majority of frail older people receive their primary support from within the household (Maeda and

Shimizu, forthcoming). Coresidency with adult children and financial support from them are substantially higher in rural than in urban areas.

Culturally prescribed patterns of joint residency also continue to be perceived as advantageous by most members of the middle generation (Palmore and Maeda, 1985). It is essential to emphasize that coresidency usually is a matter of the child continuing in the parents' home and fully 74 percent of older Japanese owned their homes in 1980 (Prime Minister's Secretariat, 1984). These arrangements would have provided eldest sons with distinct financial advantages, given low Japanese wages for younger workers and high urban housing costs. Moreover, Japanese women's high labor force participation, over the entire postwar period, has been facilitated by grandmothers' contributions to child care and domestic duties.

Support of parents in old age thus can be conceived as a direct and relatively predictable interpersonal exchange which is structured, but not solely determined, by culturally prescribed norms. The material bases for interdependencies between the generations appear to have been changed but not undermined by the postwar changes. However, more older people are living to the dependent-prone advanced years, with consequent stress on family caregivers (Maeda and Shimizu, forthcoming), and some studies suggest that dependency is becoming psychologically more difficult for older people (Lebra, 1979; Sussman, Romeis, and Maeda, 1980).

The multigenerational households, together with ideals of family harmony, may also have facilitated a measure of negotiated agreement in the ongoing cultural interpretation of social change. Many children would have been raised in large measure by grandmothers and would have viewed at firsthand their own parents' contributions to grandparents consistent with these norms. This may explain the comparatively small generational difference in views of filial responsibilities in Japan as compared to the United States (Campbell and Brody, 1985). There is mixed evidence, however, on the quality of family relationships (see Plath, 1980; and Palmore and Maeda, 1985 for contrasting views); middle-aged Japanese have negative stereotypes of aging/older people which appear to be at least as prevalent as those found in the United States and Australia (Koyano, Inoue, and Shibata, 1987). Nonetheless, multigenerational households probably have

exerted some pressures for parallel movement of core family values among the generations.

E. Social Values

The norms and practices of family support might be expected to reflect a continual negotiation between the pressures of social change and ongoing commitments to core social values. A series of national surveys found that the direction of change appears to be " . . . a significant shift from tatemae choices, or identification with normative patterns of society, to a greater preference for honne choices, or real, personal motives for daily life" (Sakamoto, 1975, p. 22). Although some individuals appeared to shift away from traditional values as they grew older, the major source of change appeared to be the succession of new cohorts having more modern views. One result was a widening generation gap for certain kinds of beliefs.

Most of the major changes in values pertained to abstract beliefs rather than specific behaviors and, when specified to particular content areas, to national and societal issues rather than individual or family matters. Values related to close interpersonal relations changed relatively little. Where they did change as a result of cohort succession, there often was a reversal as young individuals became more traditional later in life.

Traditional family values generally remained strong and stable. "Family" was most frequently selected as the "single . . . most important thing in life" in 1953, was overtaken by "health" and "happiness" during the late 1950s and 1960s, and then became the most common preference again during the 1970s (Hayashi et al., 1982, p. 456). "Filial piety" (oya-koko) and "repaying moral indebtedness" (on-gaeshi) were valued more highly than either "respecting individual rights" or "respecting freedom" during the 1970s and the trend was rising (p. 460). "Satisfaction with family life," and an "inclination to honor ancestors," also were high and rising over the 1970s (pp. 455 and 459). Social pressures to reinforce such views appeared to be equally strong through the 1970s: when asked about the "best way to make society run smoothly," the option of "pointing out each others' faults" was selected by a three-to-one margin over "one should just look after one's own affairs properly" (p. 466).

The Japanese researchers offer an insightful explanation of the apparent contradictions in these various cultural changes:

> "Summarizing the trend in the opinions of Japanese people today, we could say that new attitudes toward political problems and daily life coexist with a traditional outlook on personal relations. So first of all, we must give attention to the fact that opinions regarding political problems and daily life have changed significantly. We could say at the same time that the Japanese national character consists essentially in personal relations because the least changeable things are regarded of central value. Needless to say, those personal relations form the foundation of all social problems. Therefore, we cannot regard changes in opinions as basic changes but should judge them to be only apparent if opinions regarding personal relations have changed very little, in spite of how much other opinions may have changed. It is true that attitudes towards political problems have changed greatly as previously mentioned, yet only those politically related opinions which are far removed from the realm of personal relations have, in fact, changed. The remaining cases which touch upon human relations have changed very little. <u>These opinions toward personal relations, which may not be capable of change because they are intricately enmeshed in the interests of individuals</u> [my emphasis], play an important key role in easing or impeding more extensive changes in the opinion of Japanese people" (Sakamoto, 1975, p. 43).

F. Summary

Japan's strong normative base for intergenerational support has been exposed to unprecedently structural change over the postwar years. Traditional patterns evolving out of Confucian beliefs and an agrarian economy have been subjected to the pressures of an emergent industrial and now postindustrial economy, rapid movement through the demographic transition, and massive urbanization. Provision for support in old age through the public sector and savings in mid-life has also emerged on a substantial scale. At the same time, patterns of intergenerational support within families and basic Japanese values appear to have changed relatively slowly. The full range of these changes could be expected to have influenced stability or change of expectations and beliefs concerning family support of older people.

IV. Methods

A. Hypotheses

The first main hypothesis is that young and middle-aged women's expectations for family support in old age would have been reduced reasonably quickly as new options became available through self-provision and government. It is hypothesized that the main effect of maturation would be a reduction of uncertainty over expected reliance on family support. It is expected that change would have occurred earlier and advanced farther among social groups having greater access to the new opportunities. Finally, it is hypothesized that the new alternatives would have been received as positive alternatives and supplements to family support.

The second set of hypotheses concern change in the norms of family support for older people. It is anticipated that normative change would have proceeded more slowly than the expected behavioral change, and that it would evolve out of traditional values rather than challenge them. Further hypotheses are that more modern values would have occurred primarily as a result of cohort succession; that there would be some reversals toward more traditional views with maturity from early to middle adulthood; and that at all ages there would be some slow and lagged response to the forces of modernization. As with the expectations for support, it is hypothesized that the movement of norms would have occurred fastest among social groups exposed to more social change. Finally, it is expected that the differential impacts of social change on successive cohorts would have widened generation gaps.

A third major hypothesis concerns the congruence or divergence between personal expectations, internalized norms and preferences. Contrary to the predictions of the modernization thesis, it is expected that the strengths of Japanese values and the financial means afforded by economic development would have led to continuing high levels of congruence between expectations and support. It is expected that this congruence would be maintained while the balance of beliefs and norms would shift from traditional family support to more modern self-provision and State support. It is expected that maturation would have an effect on increasing traditional patterns of beliefs and

expectations which would run counter to the effects of historical change and cohort succession.

B. Information Source

The analysis is based on a series of 18 National Family Planning Surveys conducted by the Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi newspapers. The surveys have aimed to monitor the population developments which were central to postwar economic and social development (Population Problems Research Council, 1986). These KAP surveys (Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice) recognized that time-series data on the attitudes and decision-making of individuals provides a sound basis for understanding aggregate changes of population.

The questions on expectations and norms regarding family support in old age were included in the survey to explore their possible influence on fertility decisions: "Livelihood security in old age, successor for the household occupation and continuance of the lineage, that is to say, a desire for maintenance of the generational system, is the fundamental factor" (Population Problems Research Council, 1972a, p. 23).

C. The Sample

The surveys were carried out at an average interval of every two years between 1950 and 1986 and employed similar sampling procedures and enumeration methods. The multistage sampling procedures identified 300 primary sampling units (with probability of selection based on population at the time) and, within each sampling unit, 12 married couples in which the wife was under age 50. The information from wives used in this analysis was collected in a "leave behind," self-enumerated questionnaire which was later picked up by a field worker. Detailed reports on the methodology, data tables, and discussion of findings are available in publications by the Population Problems Research Council (various years) and Ogawa and Hodge (forthcoming).

Sample sizes and response rates were comparable between surveys. The number of cases varied between 2,600 and 3,600 women. Response rates varied between 71 percent and 92 percent, with a usual level of

85 percent. The representativeness of the sample, and quality of the data, appear to be high. Results on sensitive topics are very close to those reported by the World Fertility Survey, and the demographic characteristics align closely with those of censuses.

Respondents ranged from women born in 1901-1910 (interviewed only at ages 40 to 49 in 1950) through those in the 1957-66 birth cohort (interviewed only at age 20 to 29 in 1986). Coverage of cohorts moving through the full age range for the study is available for those born from 1930 to 1946. As shown in Table A1, the proportions of women in the forties age group increased over time and the proportions in their twenties decreased commensurately.

The sample also reflects changing marriage and childbearing patterns across the cohorts. Censuses show that the proportion of Japanese women who were aged 20 to 29 and married was 31 percent in 1950, 58 percent in 1955, remained at approximately 54 percent through the mid-1970s, and fell to 49 percent in 1980 and 42 percent in 1985. The proportions married between ages 30 to 49 years remained at approximately 85 to 90 percent over this time. This suggests that the observed changes, as cohorts pass from their twenties to their thirties, are influenced to some degree by the inclusion of women who married late only at the later point of measurement. Other possible changes in sample eligibility--as a result of divorce, death or widowhood, immigration or emigration--would have been small as the women moved through the ages from 20 to 49.

Further composition effects influence findings from questions which were asked only of those who had had children. In 1986, for example, the proportion of respondents having one or more surviving children was 76 percent for 20-29 year olds and 94 percent for 30-34 year olds. The findings on change in expectations for filial support in old age, as women move from their twenties to their thirties, thus are influenced by the inclusion only at the later time of women who had their first child late. Comparison of 1963 and 1986 figures (Table A2) suggests that this selection effect has not changed very much over the past few decades. The published data from the surveys do not show possible associations between attitudes and timing of marriage or childbearing.

More detailed data on the characteristics of particular cohorts is available only for the 1963-86 time period. Table A2 shows that,

for the sample as a whole over this time, there was a moderate increase in urban living and labor force participation. There also were sharp falls in the proportions of women having three or more children, no high-school education, or husbands in primary industry. The most notable cohort-specific differences were for women in their forties in 1963 as compared to those in the same age group in 1986.

D. Measures

The dependent variables were measured in a stream of questions which aimed to tap "familistic values" consistently across a number of rounds of the survey (Population Problems Research Council, 1965, p. 35). These questions addressed (in the following order) views on inheritance, norms of family support for the aged (see 1 below), current residency with parents, and expectations for family support (see 2 below). In some rounds of the survey, supplementary questions were added on other topics, for example, past periods of living with parents and provisions made for support in old age by childless respondents or when family support was not expected. The two questions, each accompanied with a detailed analysis, are given below:

1) WHAT DO YOU THINK OF CHILDREN TAKING CARE OF THEIR OLD PARENTS?

a) "It's a good custom"
b) "It's a natural duty for children"
c) "It's unavoidable due to shortage of old people's homes or insufficient pensions"
d) "It's not a good custom"
e) "Don't know"
f) "Other; no answer"

This question, which will be termed "norms" for support in old age, was asked of all respondents from 1963 onward. There were no significant differences between surveys in either the wording of the question or in the pre-coded response sets. However, the behavioral content of the norm and the "threshold" levels for action (Rossi and Berk, 1985), may have changed over time in ways which cannot be identified. Differences over the life cycle may be influenced by

changes of perspective from possible provider to current or past provider and potential future recipient. As will be explained further in the results, differences between the first two pre-codes suggest more traditional or more modern conceptions of the norm. The third pre-code provided a cue to respondents that dependency refers to both income support and residential care.

The second question, shown below, was included in all the surveys but was asked only of respondents having surviving children (including adopted children). The pre-coded responses for 1963-79 are also shown below and response sets for other years are shown in Figure A1. The question is hereafter termed "expectations" for support in old age.

2) DO YOU INTEND TO DEPEND ON YOUR CHILDREN IN YOUR OLD AGE?

a) "Expect to depend on children"
b) "Do not expect to depend on children"
c) "I have never thought about it"

Although the English translations of the question varied in reports over the years, the original questionnaires had the same wording in all surveys. Response biases may be less in Japan than in a comparable American survey, given the greater emphasis in Japan on predictability of care and the less onerous connotations of "dependence" (see Hashimoto, 1984, 1987). Prior to 1963, there was no specification for the kind of support, apart from the context set by earlier questions in the survey on inheritance and living with parents. From 1963 onwards, the pre-codes for the earlier question on family norms would have suggested that both income support and residential care were to be taken into account. Responses would have been influenced by variable interpretations between respondents and, probably more importantly, by the changing social context which would have given specific content to the abstract expectations.

There also were differences in the pre-coded response sets provided for the "expectations" questions (Figure A1). However, it appears feasible to aggregate the responses to reasonably comparable categories for analysis over time (Ogawa, forthcoming). Only in 1950, when more options were given for the "expect to depend on children" categories did the pre-codes appear to influence the time-series

trends. The more detailed codes for some periods also make it possible to identify preferences as well as expectations.

The women's age, cohort of birth, and positions in family and economic life served as independent variables for the analysis. Definitional discrepancies between the surveys required that categories for some independent variables, such as husband's occupation, be highly aggregated even though groups within the category displayed different behaviors. Women's labor force participation was not analyzed because disaggregated data were not available to disentangle life cycle and cohort effects. Other groups, such as college-educated women, were not analyzed because large composition changes severely limited interpretation.

E. Analysis

Three basic approaches were taken in the analysis. Time series across all surveys identify the overall extent and pace of change. They suggest the combined effects of long-term economic and social trends and identify the apparent effects of major policy initiatives. The longer term trends also reflect the changing composition of women over time.

A second approach explored the effects of individual aging and cohort succession. Movement of cohorts through the periods was identified by disaggregating respondents into ten-year age groups (where possible) for the surveys in 1955, 1965, 1975 and 1986. (There was no survey in 1985.) The selection effects caused by changing marriage rates probably were not a serious problem because the major change occurred before 1955 (see above).

The third approach examined change from 1963 to 1986 for different segments of Japanese society. This time interval is approximately equivalent to the passage of a generation (the average generation span in 1988 was 28 years; see Ogawa et al., 1986). Variables were chosen to indicate different levels of exposure to social change, as mentioned above. These analyses are particularly sensitive to composition effects and some standardized findings are presented in the last of the three sections of results (see also Table A3).

In interpreting the results, it should be kept in mind that the same individuals were not followed through time from marriage to age

49. The data show variation according to age and other social positions but do not show particular changes of individuals over the life course. The limited data from publications on the early periods restricted analyses to the group level. The cross-tabulations did not identify overlap between groups or correlation between dependent variables.

The responses also are subject to sampling error. With the large sample sizes, nearly all differences of substantive importance are statistically significant. For example, with usual sample sizes of 3,000 for each time-series observation, confidence intervals (at the .05 level) would be in the order of two to three percent for most proportions reported in the results. The smallest of the age-range samples varies between 400 and 700 respondents, yielding confidence intervals in the area of 3 to 5 percent for findings in the order of 25 percent. Some of the subgroup changes identified over the 1963 to 1986 period are smaller, with corresponding increase of sampling error. Confidence intervals can be calculated based on sample sizes as shown in Tables A1 and A2.

The findings thus provide a sound basis for exploring the likely effects on attitudes of the succession of new cohorts into married life, maturation through middle adulthood, and responses to prevailing social conditions. Results are presented in graphs which suggest the directions and magnitudes of these effects. The inevitable confounding of the age, period, and cohort effects, and the complication of unknown composition effects, require considerable substantive reasoning in drawing tentative conclusions (Glenn, 1980). The interpretations are supported by contemporary comments by Japanese researchers.

V. Expectations for Filial Support in Old Age

A. Trends

Figure 1 demonstrates that the expectations for family support in old age have been virtually reversed by Japanese mothers in young and middle adulthood over the postwar years. In 1950, when Japan had yet to launch fully its postwar development, nearly all of the women who

FIGURE 1: Expectations to Depend on Children for Support in Old Age, 1950 - 1986



Notes: See text and figure A1 for the wording of the question and response sets.
The question on expectation was not asked in 1981.
Excludes childless women.

had given the matter any thought expected to depend on their children. By 1986, little more than a quarter of respondents expected to rely on their children. The other noticeable change is that the proportion of women who had not considered their filial support in old age had declined markedly, from approximately a quarter in the early 1950s to less than 10 percent in the most recent survey.

The changes occurred basically in three stages. First, there was a gradual but definite decline in the expectations for family support over the 1950s, well before the implementation of most public income-support programs. The data cannot establish which of the social changes at the time may have accounted for the results. Japanese commentators interpreted these early trends in understandably concerned terms:

> The drastic postwar change in economy and society, however, has broken down, both substantively and psychologically, the various conditions for achieving such a traditional expectation. It is well-known that in agriculture, comprising the largest category of self-employed persons, the working population has decreased to a large extent. Moreover, the rapid spread of the nuclear family system concept has weakened the generational ties between parents and children. As a result, the general expectation of people to depend on children in old age has rapidly declined (Population Problems Research Council, 1972a, p. 23).

The data also suggest alternative explanations. Only in the first survey were respondents provided with all-encompassing options for expected family support (see Figure A1). These included "will depend on children carrying on the family business" (25 percent), and "will live together but will not depend on them for economic support" (8 percent). The dependency figures for the first period, therefore, include expectations for considerable interdependency with children. Similar effects could have been expected for later surveys, although the pre-codes for these questions did not specifically elicit responses of interdependencies with children. Moreover, given rapidly rising economic resources, it may be that more women preferred and expected to maintain independence in old age (see section on preferences below).

Expectations for family support dropped sharply from 1961 to 1963, suggesting a rapid response to the introduction of pension plans and welfare-income support. While the major fiscal impact of these

policies would have been delayed for decades, their effects on people's strategies for old-age support appear to have been virtually immediate. The high "other" responses in 1961 may have reflected uncertainty over the changes being considered at the time.

In the first interpretation of the 1960s results, made soon after the 1963 survey, the Japanese researchers surprisingly did not mention the effects of the new pensions.

> ". . . there is a feeling of being in another world. Furthermore, when it is considered that the respondents are wives who are generally lacking in economic power, there is a clear indication that the tradition of the old family system has been shattered by the striking social changes that have taken place in 18 postwar years" (Population Problems Research Council, 1972a, p. 188).

A later comment, on this same period, added:

> "As a practical matter, however, the development of the social security system has not kept pace with the progress of consciousness and this has applied as a brake on the increase of those with 'no intention to depend'" (ibid, p. 192).

Notwithstanding continuing economic growth and social change, expectations for family support remained stable through the 1960s and 1970s. Neither the improved pension and health insurance arrangements of the early 1970s, nor the shock of the oil crisis in 1973, seemed to have affected the trends.

Not until the transition into the 1980s were there further changes in the women's expectations for family support in old age. The proportions expecting to rely on a child remained constant while there was a net shift from the "never thought about it" response to the "no" category. The sharp drop of the "never thought about it" response may have been explained by the growing public concern, at the time, over economic recession and the costs of population aging.

In the 1980s, the Japanese comments on the trends toward lower expectations for family support had become much more positive:

> "the findings . . . suggest that people have now been prepared for old-age security by social security system and self-help efforts, without dependency on children. It is a new step towards independence in old age" (Population Problems Research Council, 1984, p. 15).

B. Cohort and Aging Effects

The surveys also identified changes of expectations as successive birth cohorts passed through middle adulthood. These included the initial expectations of each cohort of married women with children, changes with transitions into their thirties and then to their forties; and the historical transitions into the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The findings are influenced by selection effects and noncomparable age ranges as discussed in Section IV.

Figure 2 suggests that women become much more likely to consider their possible family support in old age as they approach middle age. While all respondents were married and had borne children, not until they had reached the older age groups would they have had experiences with adult children, support of aged parents, or reasonably definite planning of support for their own old age. The period effects appear to have impacted relatively equally on the cohorts, irrespective of their age at the time, as indicated by the parallel movement of lines on the graph.

Aging effects on the proportions expecting family support in old age follow a "V" shaped pattern (Figure 3). Most cohorts became slightly less likely to expect family support as they passed into their thirties and then became much more likely to expect it as they passed into their forties. The initial downturn may be affected by selection effects. (Women who marry and have children relatively late could have lower expectations for family support.) Alternatively, as suggested by Brody et al. (1983), youthful idealism may give way to more informed assessments as women moved through early adulthood.

The upturn in expectations for family support, as women passed into their forties, was less subject to selection effects and the changes were large and consistent across cohorts. There appears to have been a net shift from the "hadn't thought about it" to the "yes" categories. This maturation effect could have been influenced by the transitions of all generations of the women's families "upwards" in positions along family life cycles. With many Japanese men retiring from their main jobs in their mid-fifties, many of these women would have been aware of their likely levels of savings for old age.

The Japanese researchers, in noting the consistent age differences between the surveys, comment:

FIGURE 2: Percentage of Birth Cohorts Which Had Not Thought About Whether They Expect Support From Children in Old Age, 1955, 1965, 1975 and 1986.



Birth Cohorts:

B1 : Born 1906-20
B2 : Born 1916-25
B3 : Born 1921-30
B4 : Born 1931-35
B5 : Born 1926-35
B6 : Born 1936-45
B7 : Born 1946-55
B8 : Born 1957-66

FIGURE 3: Percentage of Birth Cohorts Which Expect Support From Children In Old Age, 1955 , 1965, 1975 and 1986.



Birth Cohorts:

B1 : Born 1906-20
B2 : Born 1916-25
B3 : Born 1921-30
B4 : Born 1931-35
B5 : Born 1926-35
B6 : Born 1936-45
B7 : Born 1946-55
B8 : Born 1957-66

"Of course, since dependence on children is not an actual problem in the case of the younger generation, these replies tend to be idealistic. On the other hand, whatever they may think, older people women in their late forties must be considered as being influenced by circumstances in which they must depend on children as a practical matter, particularly in the economic phase" (Population Problems Research Council, 1972a, p. 23).

"It may be reasonably assumed that people in this stage of life aged 25 to 34 years, when they are the most vigorous and energetic, have the greatest confidence and exhibit the greatest resistance to the attitude of dependency on children in old age" (Kobayashi, 1977, p. 206).

"Even in late adult age, 45-49, 43.3 percent in 1969 of them does not [sic] expect to depend on children in old age. It suggests that even adult people approaching early old age recognize the difficulty of depending on children and also the necessity of providing for themselves against old age " (Population Problems Research Council, 1972b, p. 8).

Two strong period effects appear to have influenced these general patterns of change through mid-life. First, with the historical transition from 1955 to 1965, the cohort passing into their forties at the time uncharacteristically had reduced expectations for family support in old age. The new pensions of the early 1960s may have overpowered the rise in expectations for family support which occurred with this life cycle progression for other cohorts. Second, over the most recent period, women passing into their thirties uncharacteristically became more likely to expect family support in old age. Similarly, the twenties generation in 1986 had higher expectations for family support than the preceding cohort at either the same age (ten years earlier) or at the same point in time. The slower economic growth of the mid-1980s may have brought forward in these women's lives the expectations for family support which otherwise might have occurred later in mid-life.

The largest changes over time were found in the youngest age groups. These women's husbands (and some of the women themselves) would have been expecting to contribute to pension plans throughout mid-life and thus could expect larger payments under the contributory plans. The trends reported in Figure 1 would have been brought about partly by the differential impact of pension initiatives on cohorts entering adulthood thereafter. The aggregate trends would have been more pronounced in the latest period were it not for the relatively large numbers of women in their late thirties and early forties at the

time (Japan's short baby boom).

Finally, Figure 3 indicates possible generation gaps in expectations for family support. At each period of time, respondents in their forties can be taken to be middle-aged mothers and those in their twenties can be assumed to be their recently married daughters. The results suggest that the "generation gap" changed very little between 1955 and 1965. It then widened signficantly to 1975 as the younger women had especially low expectations for family support. Over the most recent decade, the expectations of the oldest and youngest groups moved towards convergence and narrowed the generation gap to its lowest level since the mid-1950s.

C. Subgroups

Another way of viewing change is to consider the extent of consensus of expectations for family support in old age across social strata in Japanese society. The social positions of the women could indicate their financial resources, reference groups, and exposure to other aspects of social change. The findings reported below were for the 1963 to 1986 change, which approximates the passage of a generation just after the major pension initiatives. The results reflect changes and overlap in group composition (see Section IV).

Figure 4 shows that, in both 1963 and 1986, women's expectations varied signficantly between different parts of the Japanese society. The expectations for family support in old age were relatively higher in rural areas: among women having husbands in primary industry; among those who worked in family businesses; and among those having relatively less education and more children. It would appear that expectations for family support were greater for those likely to have more interdependency with adult children (farmers and family businessmen) and those more likely to have a son (an effect of having more children). Groups which probably had greater financial means to provide for themselves in old age had relatively higher rates of expected independence from family support in old age.

Differences in the rates of change for the groups also were consistent with their likely access to new options for retirement income. Expectations for family support were stable at low levels for those having husbands in clerical/employer/professional occupations.

FIGURE 4: Percentage of Selected Social Groups Which Expect Support from Children in Old Age, 1963 -1986



Note: See Table A1 for sample sizes

Most husbands in these occupations would have had earlier access to the contributory pension plans, and greater opportunities for private savings and employer provision earlier in the postwar boom. By 1963 they may have already reached a "floor" level from which it would be difficult to move further downwards (Glenn, 1980). Whatever the individual's retirement income, instrumental support in the event of disability would be expected to be forthcoming mainly from family--in the present as well as the past.

The increase in expectations for family support among the better educated women may have also been influenced by "floor" effects. It seems more likely that, with large increases in their numbers over time, the composition and, therefore, the expectations of the group became closer to those of the mainstream.

Expectations for family support declined particularly rapidly among groups having higher expectations in 1963. The most likely explanation was relatively late access to anticipated levels of retirement income sufficient to provide alternatives to family support. Manual and factory workers would have had less capacity to save privately or to have had employer contributions to retirement funds early in the postwar years. As compared to white-collar workers, the blue-collar workers' entry into contributory pension plans, particularly for those in small businesses, generally came later and they would need to work longer to have enough contributions to contemplate an independent retirement. Those in primary industry, many of whom would also be in the self-employed category, did not have a contributory pension plan until 1970.

The rise in expected family support in rural areas is more apparent than real. The increases in these areas were found, on closer inspection, to be a shift from the "haven't thought about it" category to both the "yes" and "no" categories. This may suggest that an unquestioned assurance of family support for this group may have given way to more active consideration among some individuals. In addition, the rural group also became a smaller--and therefore potentially more divergent--group from the mainstream.

The social groups could have differed in their expectations because of associations with the age group and cohort effects discussed above. The relatively older women (and earlier cohorts) in the social groups were disproportionately more likely to expect family

support at both points of time (see Table A2). It seems more likely, however, that differential impacts of retirement-income options were part of the mechanisms explaining the cohort and aging differences. The following section suggests that the changed expectations resulted mainly from improved means to fulfill preferences, and Section VII explores further the influence of compositional effects.

D. Preferences and Uncertainty

A central question is whether the decreased expectations for family support were chosen as a result of new alternatives or forced by a breakdown or traditional support. In 1950, levels of uncertainty and worries over children's willingness or capability to provide support were small. Less than three percent of the women chose the option "would like to depend on children but this may not be possible" (Population Problems Research Council, 1972a, p. 128). The proportion increased to six percent for 1952 and remained at approximately this level until 1963, when this response option was dropped from the pre-coded responses (ibid, p. 223).

As the proportion of respondents expecting to rely on children declined through the 1950s, the Mainichi researchers added a question asking if those who did not expect to rely on children had "made provision against old age (property, pension, or annuity) without depending on children." In the late 1950s, only 36 percent had done so, and 59 percent said they intended to do so in the future; the proportions were even lower (24 and 51 percent, respectively) for those who did not have children (ibid, p. 27). The figures remained similar through the mid-1970s (Population Problems Research Council, 1977, p. 208). In 1977, the proportion which had made provision was 50 percent for women aged 45 to 49 years, suggesting that much of the self-provision for old age would be very late in middle age if at all. It is possible, however, that the respondents may have overlooked compulsory savings through the national pension plans.

More detailed findings, available only for 1986, reveal high levels of uncertainty in the expectations of the women. Among the 27 percent expecting to rely on family support, a substantial majority (21 percent of all women) gave a "yes, if possible" response. As compared to the six percent who gave a comparable finding in 1963 (see

above), this suggests a rapid rise over the last two decades of uncertainty over the willingness or capacity of children to support respondents in old age.

Many more women are uncertain about their ability to remain independent of family in old age. In 1986, of the 64 percent not expecting to rely on children, 44 percent answered "no, if possible." The results suggest that the declining expectations for family support in old age mainly resulted from increased preference for independence and the anticipated financial means of achieving it.

Finally if one combines the two "if possible" responses and the "never thought about it" answers, half of the respondents were uncertain about whether or not they would rely on filial support when they reach old age.

VI. Norms of Family Support in Old Age

A. Trends

The findings on the stability of norms of family support in old age contrast sharply with the dramatic changes in personal expectations. Over the full time range for which data is available (1963 to 1986), there was remarkable consistency and apparent strength in these beliefs (Figure 5). Between 70 and 80 percent of married Japanese women (including the childless ones) appear to have subscribed to the basic principle irrespective of other social changes. Possible reductions of support for the norm, up to 1963, could not have been very great, given the high acceptance at that time. The only indication of possible relaxation of the norm was the small increase in the "don't know" responses. Outright rejection was extremely rare at all times.

The data do not show possible changes in the intensity or limits of norms for family support. However, respondents were presented with the option that family support was "unavoidable due to a lack of facilities and inadequate old-age pension system." Very few of them selected this indication that family should respond only because government support was unavailable.

The improved public and self provision probably did change

FIGURE 5: Attitudes Toward Children Taking Care of Their Old Parents, 1963 to 1986



Notes: *See text for wording of the question.*
The question was not asked in 1977 nor in 1979.
Includes all women.

expected behaviors and thresholds of action associated with the norm (Rossi and Berk, 1985). The additional support from other sources would have made it easier for the women in middle age to adhere to the traditional norms as it applied to their support to aged parents. (The small but nonetheless consistent reduction of the "unavoidable due to a lack of facilities and inadequate old age pension system" responses is consistent with this proposition.) However the processes may have evolved, the Japanese women maintained their beliefs in family support in old age.

The only large change over time was the way in which respondents expressed their acceptance of the norm. In particular, there was a significant shift from the "good custom" to the "natural duty as children" responses. The contemporary Japanese interpretation of this change was: "It suggests that perception of an inherent responsibility of man is much more dominant rather than social moral sense" (Population Problems Research Council, 1984, p. 13).

B. Aging and Cohort Effects

Figure 6 shows that the reductions in the "good custom" responses were primarily attributable to cohort succession. The largest gaps were between those in their forties in 1975 (born 1936-1945 as compared to those in their forties in 1986 (born 1946-1955). Married women in their twenties were much more likely to give the "good custom" response in 1965 as compared to 1975. There were no further declines on the entry of the next cohort of young women, suggesting that this process of change may be stabilizing.

The internalized norm appear to have changed very little as women progressed through different vantage points in intergenerational exchange. For example, the cohort which passed into their forties during the 1965-75 period showed little change in their responses over time. The cohort which followed them showed a moderate shift to the "natural duty" option as they passed through the same ages ten years later. Over the last period there was a shift from "don't know" to "it's a natural duty" for both cohorts growing older at the time.

Possible generation gaps are revealed by the views of women in their twenties as compared to those in their forties. The gaps in both 1963 and 1986 appear to have emerged in terms of the conception

FIGURE 6: Attitudes of Birth Cohorts Towards Children Taking Care of Their Old Parents, 1965 and 1986



Birth Cohorts:

B1: 1916-25 **B2:** 1926-35 **B3:** 1936-45 **B4:** 1946-55 **B5:** 1956-65

of the norm rather than acceptance of it. Moreover, the generation gaps in interpretations appear to have been reduced over time as the "natural duty" idea gained widespread acceptance.

C. Social Groups

The norms of family support were upheld strongly irrespective of the social position of the married women in either 1963 or 1986 (Figure 7). The slightly higher "good custom" responses among those with large families and low education probably result from the disproportionate numbers of women from earlier cohorts in these groups. The findings emphasize the high levels of uniformity and similar rates of change in the norms of family support in Japan. The homogeneity of normative beliefs stands in sharp contrast to the variation between groups in their personal expectations for support. To the extent that respondents may have framed responses based on their own possible support of aged parents, it is notable that the groups more exposed to social change probably had greater financial means to fulfill their perceived obligations.

VII. Congruence of Norms and Expectations

A. Patterns

The extent of postwar change raises important questions about the consistency between expectations and beliefs. Table 1 relates the norms and expectations of married women with children in 1986. The personal expectation for family support in old age was relatively higher among those who believed in the norms reinforcing its provision. The expectations were very similar irrespective of whether the norm was expressed in its traditional or more modern form. The small minority which disagreed, voiced reservations, or otherwise did not subscribe to the norm was particularly unlikely to expect family support in its old age. Although the processes are unclear, the findings suggest some tendency towards negotiated consistency between normative beliefs and personal expectations.

FIGURE 7: Attitudes of Selected Social Groups Towards Children Taking Care of Their Old Parents, 1963 and 1986



1: Urban
2: Rural

1: Clerical/ Professional/ Technical/Self Employed
2: Sales/Small Business
3: Manual/Factory
4: Primary Industry

1: Housewife
2: Family Worker
3: Employed/ Self Employed

1: Elementary
2: High School

The most notable finding, however, is the wide range of personal expectations among the large majority of respondents who accept the norm. The single most common situation is the acceptance of the norm of family support combined with the personal expectation not to receive family support in old age. The "no, if possible" responses suggest that the discrepancy arises primarily from a preference not to rely on family. A much smaller proportion of women believe in and apparently prefer family support while voicing uncertainty over its availability (the "yes, if possible responses").

B. Aging and Cohort Effects

To further explore change from 1963 to 1986, a typology was developed relating norms and expectations (see definitions in Figure 8). The proportions fell slightly in the "Traditional" type which unequivocably believed in and expected filial support (29 to 24 percent). There was a comparable increase in the "Modern" type which neither fully accepted nor expected filial support (15 to 20 percent). The largest net changes were the increase of the "Less Support" type (from 35 to 44 percent) and the reduction in the "Don't Know" category

Table 1. Congruence of Norms and Expectations for Family Support in Old Age, 1986

Norms of Family Support in Old Age	Personal Expectation of Family Support in Old Age					Total	
	'Yes'	'Yes, if possible'	'No, if possible'	'No'	'Never Thought'	Pct.	No.
'Good Custom'	11	23	44	16	9	100	396
'Natural Duty'	7	25	42	19	7	100	1301
'Unavoidable'	2	14	58	24	2	100	169
'Not Good Custom'	0	12	45	41	2	100	83
Other[1]	3	9	46	27	14	100	345
TOTAL	6	21	43	21	8	100	2294

[1] Includes 'don't know', others, and 'no answer'

(16 to 8 percent). The "More Support" group remained consistently small (5 percent for both times).

Variations by age groups over time reflect findings explored earlier in this paper. "Traditional" patterns predominate among the oldest groups in both time periods. As the 1934-43 cohort moved through mid-life, they showed a substantial net movement from the "Don't Know" to the "Traditional" type. While generation gaps were not widening, there was one interesting reversal. Women in their forties moved to higher proportions having "Modern" views while the women in their twenties remained stable at a very low (and possible "floor") level in this respect.

The entry of new cohorts to the family stage of life was not bringing about significant change. There was, in fact, virtually no change in the age twenties group with the passage of a full generation. Cohort succession in older age groups, however, appears to have had a substantial influence. In the thirties generation, the exit of 1924-33 birth cohort, and the entrance of the 1947-56 cohort, resulted in particularly large net shift from "Traditional" and "Don't Know" to "Less Support" and "Modern."

C. Social Groups

More detailed findings, presented in Table 2, show 1963-1986 changes within particular combinations of social "locations" and age groups. This identifies more clearly the variation between groups and standardizes for life-cycle positions and socioeconomic status. Even with the adjustments, some categories would have had substantial compositional changes in other respects. For example, the rural group would have had major compositional shifts as the proportions fell from 36 percent in 1963 to 22 percent in 1986 (Table A2).

The age differences in attitudinal change, as reported above, generally follow the same patterns within the various social positions for the age groups. Thus, the cohort and aging effects do not appear to have resulted primarily from the changing social compositions of these groups. After taking into account the age differences over time, women throughout Japanese society were moving, albeit slowly over these decades, away from traditional beliefs and expectations. There were, however, exceptions to the uniformity of age-adjusted

FIGURE 8: Typology of Norms and Expectations for Family Support In Old Age, by Age Groups, 1963 and 1986



Note : Excludes childless women

Variable Definition :	Belief in Family Support [1]	Expectations for Family Support [2]
Traditional	YES	YES
Modern	NO	NO
More Support	NO	YES
Less Support	YES	NO
Don't Know	YES or NO	DON'T KNOW

1 'Yes' includes 'Good Custom' and 'Natural Duty'
'No' includes 'Unavoidable', 'Not Good Custom', 'Don't Know' and 'Others'

2 'Yes' includes 'yes' and 'yes, if possible'
'No' includes 'no' and 'no, if possible'

rates of change.

For women in their twenties, the exceptions to the overall stability of views occurred among those who had high-school education or those with husbands in clerical/employer/professional occupations. An increasing proportion of these young women expressed "Traditional" views (19 and 23 percent respectively in 1986), thus bringing them closer to the mainstream. The results for education probably were

Table 2 Typology of Norms and Expectations for Family Support in Old Age by Age Groups and Social Groups 1986 and 1963-1986

Social groups		20-29 years Trad	Mod	More	Less	D/K	30-39 years Trad	Mod	More	Less	D/K	40-49 years Trad	Mod	More	Less	D/K
Total	'86	20	15	3	40	22	19	23	2	49	7	24	21	5	46	5
	'63-'86	+1	+1	-	+2	-2	-10	+6	-2	+15	-9	-8	+8	-2	+9	-7
Urban	'86	18	17	1	42	22	16	23	2	52	7	23	21	5	46	5
	'63-'86	+3	-2	-2	+1	0	-8	+3	-2	+16	-9	-8	+8	-2	+9	-6
Rural	'86	-	-	-	-	-	33	18	4	35	10	57	10	8	22	3
	'63-'86	-	-	-	-	-	-5	+8	-1	+5	-7	+11	+2	+2	-8	-7
One Child	'86	18	16	3	40	23	16	23	3	50	8	26	16	7	48	3
	'63-'86	0	+1	-1	0	0	-7	+4	0	+14	-11	+3	+5	+3	-3	-8
Two Child	'86	24	14	4	39	19	17	24	2	50	7	27	22	6	40	5
	'63-'86	+5	-5	+2	+2	-4	-5	+4	-2	+12	-9	-12	+6	+2	+10	-6
Three Child	'86	-	-	-	-	-	25	20	2	45	8	38	12	4	41	5
	'63-'86	-	-	-	-	-	-12	+7	-3	+14	-6	+7	+3	-3	0	-7
Clerical etc. Husb.	'86	19	13	3	43	22	16	24	2	51	7	25	22	3	46	4
	'63-'86	+7	-6	+1	-3	-1	-3	+4	0	+7	-8	0	+6	-2	+2	-6
Sales/Sm. Bus. Husb	'86	-	-	-	-	-	23	17	1	52	7	31	16	6	42	5
	'63-'86	-	-	-	-	-	0	+3	-4	+26	-25	-	-	-	-	-
Manual/Fact. Husb.	'86	20	17	3	37	23	19	24	3	46	8	30	21	8	35	5
	'63-'86	+1	+3	-2	+3	-5	-16	+6	-2	+20	-8	-13	+16	-3	+9	-9
Prim.Indust. Husb.	'86	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	61	8	8	17	6
	'63-'86	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+1	+3	-1	0	-3
Primary Educ.	'86	25	15	5	40	15	28	23	5	36	8	40	18	9	28	5
	'63-'86	+1	+2	+1	+5	-9	-11	+12	-3	+10	-8	-5	+10	0	+2	-7
High School Educ.	'86	22	14	3	38	22	19	22	2	50	7	27	19	5	44	5
	'63-'86	+10	-5	+1	-3	-3	-1	+1	0	+9	-9	+6	0	+2	+6	-2

Notes: See Figure 8 for definitions for the typology and Table A2 for definitions of social groups.

The figures in the cells show the proportion of women having each type, for categories defined by social group and age category. For example, the first four figures in the upper left of the table show that, among all women aged 20 to 29 years in 1986, 20 per cent were 'Traditional', 15 per cent 'Modern', 3 per cent 'More Support', 40 per cent 'Less Support', and 22 per cent 'Don't Know'. The second row shows the percentage change in each Type from 1963 to 1986.

A '-' indicates fewer than 50 respondents in a category of social group by age group.

Sample sizes can be calculated from the figures in Table A2.

affected partly by the increasing proportions having a high-school education but there was no such compositional change in the proportions married to white-collar workers. New entrants to middle-class family life, who were at the forefront of change several decades ago, appear to have been experiencing a small countertrend back to traditional attitudes.

The shift to the "Less Support" category, already pronounced for women in their thirties, was substantially higher among those having husbands in manual and factory jobs (+26 percent), and sales/small business (+26 percent), as compared to husbands in clerical/employer/professional occupations (+7 percent). This may suggest that people in less advangtageous class positions were "catching up" with the changes of views made earlier by the middle classes.

There also were exceptions in the general trend towards "Less Support" among those in their forties. "Traditional" responses remained very high for those who had husbands in primary industries (61 percent in 1986) and there was a small countertrend increasing "Traditional" among the overlapping rural category (to 57 percent in 1986). Both of these divergent trends probably resulted from the groups becoming much smaller--and increasingly unusual--sections of Japanese society. The increased "Traditional" response among women with high-school education may reflect the reverse process, as better educated women became relatively less rare and unusual in this age group.

In summary, there was considerable similarity between the social groups, in their patterns of beliefs and expectations for filial support, once age differences are taken into account. The 1963-86 changes appear to have narrowed diversity between social groups within each of the three age ranges. By 1986, differences in terms of all measures of social positions were relatively small within all age groups except the oldest one. Even among those in their forties, social class variations were limited apart from the distinctive primary industry group. The most notable finding was the marked diversity between individuals who were at common positions in the life cycle and in similar locations in social structures.

VIII. Discussion and Conclusions

This paper on intergenerational support patterns has aimed to work in the "middle ground" linking macroanalysis of social change and microanalysis of life-span development. It has examined the norms and expectations for family support in old age among successive cohorts of young married women, and the ways in which their views may have changed with passage through middle age in a progressively more modern Japan. Time-series data from the Mainichi national fertility surveys provided a basis to consider the effects of individual aging, cohort succession, and periods of history; differential rates of change within social structures; and the possible divergence of norms and expectations. While comparable questions were asked in national samples over time, the same individuals were not queried through mid-life and the social context in which answers were given would have changed considerably.

Three central propositions were examined in the analyses. First, changes of expectations were expected to have occurred relatively quickly, in response to widening public-sector and self-provision alternatives to family support. Second, deeply seated norms of family support were expected to have shifted more gradually as a result of cohort succession and reinterpretation rather than loss of traditional values. Third, with Japan's strong traditional values and unprecedented economic growth, it was expected that consistency between beliefs and expectations would have been maintained notwithstanding rapid social change.

A. Expectations for Filial Support

With regard to the first hypothesis, the findings show a massive decline over the postwar years in the expectation of young and middle-aged mothers for filial support in old age. Although the trend began during the rapid changes of the 1950's, the most precipitous fall in filial expectations occurred when various income support provisions were introduced by the public sector in the early 1960s. The sharpness of this period effect, and its impact on all age groups at the time, suggests that the change was directly related to the reduced expectations for filial support. Over recent years, there has been

more stability of expectations at low levels, possibly as a result of having reached a "floor" level (Glenn, 1980) or increased concern over capacities to remain independent from family in old age. The findings are consistent with Kiesler's (1981) proposition that personal plans and motivations are highly responsive to structural change.

In the case of Japan, the provision of public support and increased self-provision apparently has led rather than followed the reduced expectations for family support in old age. In this culture, which strongly values intergenerational reciprocity, and in a period of rising economic affluence, the financial position of older people appeared to have improved with modernization. The economic means and political support for these developments emerged very quickly--over the passage of less than one generation--suggesting considerable overlap and possible integration between traditional and modern forms of financial support. Unlike some other societies undergoing rapid development, Japan did not appear to have a "lost" cohort of older people who suffered during a hiatus between a breakdown of traditional support and the emergence of public support some time later (Cowgill and Holmes, 1972; Holmes, 1987).

Reasonably consistent life-span patterns were found to be interwoven with the broader trends and turns of history. As with previous cross-sectional studies (Brody et al, 1983; Campbell and Brody, 1985), relatively more young women in their twenties had idealistically high expectations for family support or had yet to consider the question of their support in old age. As they passed into their thirties, a time of life when personal power and responsibilities are at their peak, expectations for family support in old age declined significantly. As the women began to approach old age while passing into their forties, their expectations for family support rose appreciably. The latter change could have resulted from greater acceptance of dependency, "credit" earned through support of one's own aged parents, or decreased confidence over personal resources to be accumulated before reaching old age.

These patterns across the life cycle were influenced by periods of history in several ways. Earlier in the postwar period, successive cohorts were entering family life with lower expectations for family support in old age. However, over the most recent decade, in which the pressures of population aging received widespread attention in

Japan, there were particularly great reductions in the proportions of young women who had not considered their support in old age and small increases of those expecting family support. The results provide partial support for the notion that social change has a particuarly great effect on young adults, but it is to be emphasized that other age groups were also affected by period effects.

As other studies have found in the domain of political attitudes (Cutler and Kauffman, 1975), strong period effects can override aging effects found in mid-life in other periods of history. For example, with the rapid growth of alternatives in the early 1960s, expectations for family support did not increase among women passing into their forties at that time. Generation gaps in expectations appear to have widened slightly from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s and narrowed over the most recent decade of less rapid change growth of alternatives to family support.

The expectation for increasing independence in old age appears to have resulted primarily from personal preferences for independence and the improved private and public means to achieve it. However, by 1986 a significant minority of individuals were uncertain about either their own capacities to remain independent or, for the minority who still expected family support, the ability of their children to provide it. The findings support Plath's (1980) view that heightened levels of uncertainty may arise with a shift away from traditional forms of family support. They also are consistent with Kiesler's (1981) complementary argument that greater sense of individual responsibility may increase levels of uncertainty. As retirement income becomes increasingly certain in Japan, the expected behaviors associated with family support may be shifting to the less predictable area of needs for instrumental support.

Expectations for family support in old age declined first and furthest among groups at the forefront of social change. White-collar workers, urban residents, and better educated women had low expectations in the 1960s, presumably because they had earlier access to alternative support in old age. The changes appear to have diffused to other groups whose improved retirement income options generally occurred in later periods of history. Gaps between social groups could possibly have widened early in the postwar years but they appear to have (with few exceptions) lessened over recent decades.

Overall, the structural changes in Japanese society over time have increased the size of groups having lower propensities for expecting family support in old age.

B. Norms of Filial Support

Notwithstanding the changes of personal expectations nad policy developments, there was remarkable strength and stability in the apparent adherence to the norms of filial support to parents in old age. Outright rejection of the norms, or even ambivalence or uncertainty, were rare. As posited by other commentators on attitudinal change (for example, Sears, 1981), there was very little evidence of any changes in these fundamental beliefs as individuals moved through middle age. The findings support the second hypothesis that socialization of deep-seated values and norms occurs in childhood with relatively little change as women moved from the idealism of youth to the responsibilities of mid-life, and from periods of few alternatives to substantial alternatives to family provision for support in old age.

The main change over time appeared to result from the emergence into adulthood of successive cohorts inculcated with the cultural interpretations of an increasingly modern Japan. The most notable watershed was between women experiencing childhood before the war and those raised during the postwar era. Later cohorts were more likely to interpret the norm of family support as a more modern "natural duty of children" rather than the traditional "good custom." This disparity between the generations appears to have narrowed recently as the "natural duty of children" view gained widespread acceptance. Normative differences between social groups were even smaller and generally narrowed over time. As a result, there has been continuing and possibly increasing normative consensus, at least on this abstract conception of the ground rules for intergenerational support.

Along with other beliefs concerning close personal relationships (see discussion of Hayashi et al. 1982 and Sakamoto, 1975 above), there apparently has been a slow and steady reconceptualization from more traditional beliefs, based on convention and usual practice, to more modern views conceived in terms of direct interpersonal obligations. Sano (1958, p. 31), on the basis of research conducted in the mid-1950s, made the following observation which continues to be highly relevant:

> "The structure of family membership . . . decrees a code of moral behavior and corresponding ethical ideals. The tenacity of moral values should never be underestimated. Under ordinary circumstances people are unlikely to accept as bad today what they believed as good only yesterday. The structural pattern of a "normal" family, in the sense that it is sanctioned by the society as a "proper" or "ideal" form of family, is also determined in part by economic factors. Once a particular structure is established as the most satisfactory under certain prevailing economic conditions, then that norm is sustained by moral and emotional values associated with it. These are probably the factors which account for the considerable resistance often found in social organizations like the family to any radical change in a relatively short period of time."

These findings have several important implications. First, social change may influence overall belief structures without impacting differentially on particular socioeconomic strata within a society (see Bengtson et al., 1975). The major gap between social groups in their expectations for support in old age, and the small gaps in terms of normative beliefs, suggest that structural change has been more important than cultural change in driving changes of intergenerational support patterns. Second, societies can undergo rapid social change, including changes in intergenerational support patterns, with adaptation rather than loss of their core norms and values. Japan provides at least a notable exception to any generalization that societal development breaks down traditional norms of family support. Family support patterns in other cultures also may be changing more by structural influences on the means of (and need for) fulfilling perceived family obligations than by any relaxation of adherence to traditional norms.

It remains possible that stability and generational consensus over abstract norms may dissolve when actions have to be determined for particular situations of older people and their children (Rossi and Berk, 1985). Expectations in mid-life could vary substantially from actual needs and resources in old age. The expectations for family support among women in their forties in 1965, found to be just over 40 percent (Figure 3), was in broad terms comparable to the proportions of older people receiving some financial support from families in the 1980s (Maeda and Shimizu, forthcoming). Consistency between mid-life expectations and later support in old age, of course, would be much less for individuals than for a cohort as a whole. For

the minority who would require extended care in old age, actual levels of family support now being received probably exceed the mid-life expectations suggested by the Mainichi data of the 1960s. There are few alternatives to family care; adult children overwhelmingly expect that bedridden parents will be cared for by themselves or a sibling (Section on Aging, 1982, as reported in Maeda, 1983; Maeda and Shimizu, forthcoming).

C. Congruence of Norms and Expectations

The third hypothesis, positing continuing consistency between beliefs and expectations, was only partly confirmed. There was a small movement from consistently traditional views (expecting and believing in family support) to consistently modern ones (neither expecting nor believing in family support). The most notable change, however, was the increase in the proportion of those who believed in filial support while not expecting to rely on it in old age. These findings are contrary to cognitive dissonance theories (Kiesler, 1981) predicting adjustment of beliefs to motivations and expectations.

As noted earlier, the discrepancy resulted more from preferences for independence, and the improved means to achieve it, than from any anticipated reluctance or inability of children to provide support. Discrepancies between beliefs and expectations may be more tenable when one expects to receive less support than one believes is due. It is possible, of course, that the divergence of beliefs and expectations in mid-life would be larger than the gap between beliefs and actual support for those who become dependent in old age. If so, the psychological costs of adjusting to more dependency than had been expected may be eased by ongoing beliefs in the norms of family support in old age. Relatively few Japanese appear to be in the more difficult position, found in the United States, of having to adjust prior beliefs in independence from family to fit emergent needs for family support in advanced old age (Okraku, 1987).

The discrepancy between expectations and beliefs appeared to have occurred earliest and progressed farthest among groups which could be expected to be relatively more "modern" in their financial means and possible outlook on family responsibilities. These groups have maintained relatively stable views over recent decades while those having

consistently "traditional" views in the early 1960s have more recently experienced greater change to more "modern" viewpoints. Indeed, recent cohorts having financially advantageous positions in Japanese society may be having a small reversal of earlier trends toward norms and expectations of generational independence. The differences between women in different "places" in Japanese social structure thus appear to have lessened over time. Gaps between generations also appear to have narrowed slightly and probably will narrow further with the passage of the cohort of women presently in their forties.

Given a particular life cycle position and cohort of birth, there now appears to be far more variation within segments of Japanese society than between them. With a few exceptions, such as women with husbands in primary industries, the structural variables which influence personal resources, socialization, and reference groups appear to have little influence on contemporary views on intergenerational support. This may reflect the fact that virtually all social classes now have some coverage in mid-life for retirement income and virtually none of them anticipate clear alternatives to coresident family support in the event of chronic disability. While the need for income in old age is predictable and provision can be made in advance, the emergence of needs for long-term personal care is a highly unpredictable "contingent risk" and the demands and capacities for meeting these needs are equally unpredictable (Kendig, forthcoming).

D. New Patterns of *Intergenerational Exchange*

It seems likely that the balance of intergenerational support which continues through families is increasingly being influenced by particular personalities, family dynamics and unanticipated crises. While the family, government and other social institutions may have experienced comparable modernization, thus maintaining a measure of congruence at the macrolevel, individuals could well have experienced increasing contraditions and discontinuities as they proceeded through the different levels of intergenerational support patterns. The provision of support in mid-life, and its possible receipt in late life, may involve more of the unpredictable needs and negotiations between family members as reported in the United States (Mutran and Reitzes, 1984). The rapid growth of the oldest age groups, with consequent

risks of chronic disability and long periods of widowhood, probably is accentuating these pressures.

The Mainichi surveys identified some changes in the household bases for organizing intergenerational exchange. Little more than a third of the middle-aged women were living with a parent or a parent-in-law over the mid-1960s to mid-1980s period, but another third had lived with a parent after marriage and an unknown proportion would have lived with them later in mid-life (Population Problems Research Council, 1968, p. 17; 1977, pp. 218-219; 1986, p., 158). In 1977, the patriarchal pattern of residence with the husband's parents continued to prevail by a ratio of more than four to one in multigenerational households (Population Problems Research Council, 1978, p. 111). The ongoing household, with a continuous and predictable stream of generations passing through it, may be giving way to more complicated processes of dissolution and re-formation over the life course.

The motivation for coresidency over the 1960s and 1970s was increasingly social and cultural--"natural thing to do"--and where economic motives prevailed, the balance of benefits was perceived to flow more to the younger than the older generations (Population Problems Research Council, 1977, pp. 218-219). Concern over social disapproval for separate households was extremely rare. With the direct interdependence between parents and a child continuing through the child's adulthood, usually in the home owned by the older generation, Japanese parents are continuing to lay strong bases in mid-life for receiving reciprocal support from the same child later in life. The burden of coresidency would have been limited by increased public- and self-provision of income support for the aged, and ongoing joint households may ease the transition to coresident care should it become necessary.

The 1963-1977 trends in preferences for inheritance show additional changes in possible bases for negotiating support in old age. There was a drop in the preference for the traditional pattern of "only to eldest son" (or occasionally eldest daughter) (15 to 8 percent), a slight drop in the more modern pattern of "equal to all children" (48 to 44 percent), and a steep rise in the direct interpersonal exchange "only to children who will take care of us in the future" (18 to 32 percent) (Population Problems Research Council, 1978, p. 115). Inheritance adds another strand to the direct parents-

to-one-child (particularly mother-in-law to daughter-in-law) exchanges in mid-life.

Ironically, traditional Japanese culture may have more scope for structuring predictable and "fair" exchanges between parents and a child than is found in western countries with long-established values of individualism. These patterns of intergenerational exchange also may provide a partial explanation for the contradiction between comparatively low levels of affection and high levels of support between the generations in Japanese family life. A mother-in-law to daughter-in-law relationship, in which the mother-in-law had a superior position in the same household in mid-life, arguably sets a poor affective basis for interaction later in life. It certainly would be expected to be very different from that between a western mother and daughter having had strong attachments from childhood and primarily expressive and social bonds through the child's adulthood. Japanese patterns of family exchange, with the usual material rewards to the caregiver, may lessen political concern for inequities of family-caring responsibilities among women in middle age.

E. Conclusion

This paper has aimed to show the ways in which Japan's unparalleled postwar changes may have influenced women's views on intergenerational support as they passed through mid-life. The results appear to confirm findings in the western literature that the scope for change in mid-life is small with respect to basic norms but large with respect to expectations for behavior. There appears to have been renegotiation of the terms and conceptions of intergenerational exchange without any overall reduction in the favorable treatment of older people or any significant increase of cultural contraditions. The most notable contradiction, the belief in filial support combined with the expectation of independence, is largely a matter of preference and increased provision of resources through the public sector.

In contemporary Japan, direct interpersonal exchanges between parents and designated children remain strong over the life course. New interpretations of old filial obligations continue to structure the provision of support to parents in late life and contributions by parents to children in mid-life and through inheritance. With the

shifting emphasis from income support to personal care, and greater emphasis on personal commitments rather than traditional custom, the scope for uncertainty and interpersonal negotiation may have increased. While joint households can be advantageous for both older and middle generations, and retirement income has become more adequate and predictable, chronic disability remains unpredictable and is becoming more common. Support with protracted personal care may prove to be the acid test defining the limits of coresident family support and the responsibilities of government in the future.

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Figure A1. Response Sets for Expectations to Depend on Children in Old Age

Survey years	Recode	Original phrasing and ordering of precoded answers
1950	No	1) "I will get along without depending on my children at all"
	Yes	2) "I will depend on my children"
	Yes	3) "I will depend on the child who will take over my business"
	Yes	4) "I will live with my children, but will not depend on them economically"
	No	5) "I would like to, but it does not seem possible"
	Other	6) "I have never thought of it"
1952-61	No	1) "I will get along without depending on my children at all"
	Yes	2) "I will depend on my children"
	No	3) "I would like to, but it does not seem possible"
	Other	4) "I have never thought about it"
1963-79	Yes	1) "Expect to depend on children"
	No	2) "Do not expect to depend on children"
	Other	3) "I have never thought about it"
1984-86	Yes	1) "Yes"
	Yes	2) "Yes, if possible"
	No	3) "No, if possible"
	No	4) "No"
	Other	5) "Never thought about it"

Table A1. Age Distribution of Married Women in the Mainichi Surveys, 1950-86

Year of Survey	Age Groups (years)						Total	
	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	Pct.	No.
1950	12.6	---	42.5	---	---	44.7	---	100	2797
1955	6.3	---	45.8	---	---	47.8	---	100	2949
1961	6.8	---	44.9	---	---	48.3	---	100	2897
1965	6.8	18.9		22.8	21.0	18.5	12.0	100	3073
1971	4.9	16.5		21.4	21.7	19.1	16.4	100	3223
1975	3.8	16.0		22.2	19.8	21.1	17.1	100	2780
1981	2.8	15.7		22.7	19.4	20.2	19.2	100	3077
1986	3.0	11.6		18.5	26.1	20.8	20.0	100	2558

Note: Detailed age breakdowns were not available in publications presenting data for the 1950 to 1961 periods.

Source: Population Problems Research Council, various dates

Table A2. Age-Specific Characteristics of Respondents, 1963 and 1986

Selected Characteristics	20-29 yrs '63	20-29 yrs '86	30-39 yrs '63	30-39 yrs '86	40-49 yrs '63	40-49 yrs '86	Total '63	Total '86
Urban (pct)	67	76	61	80	65	77	64	78
No. Living Children (pct)								
None	24	22	6	5	7	4	11	7
One	42	42	14	14	8	11	19	17
Two	29	26	41	56	20	57	32	52
Three plus	5	10	39	25	65	28	48	24
Husbands' Occupations (pct)								
Clerical/Tech/Prof/Selfemployed	54	52	56	49	55	39	55	46
Sales/small business employee	6	13	4	20	4	27	5	21
Manual/factory	24	27	18	25	19	25	20	25
Primary industry	14	4	20	3	19	6	18	4
Wives' Labor force Participation (pct)								
Housewife	59	57	54	46	55	32	56	42
Family worker	22	10	30	16	32	23	29	18
Employed/selfemployed	18	31	14	34	12	42	14	37
Wives' Education (ptc)								
Elementary	50	7	52	13	66	34	56	21
High school	44	54	43	57	31	52	40	55
Junior/tech.college	4	28	3	21	3	10	3	18
College/University	2	10	1	6	0	4	1	6
SAMPLE SIZES	777	376	1382	1143	991	1046	3150	2565

Note: Some variables total to less than 100 per cent because some very small categories are not shown.

Source: Unpublished data provided by N. Ogawa, Nihon University.