

# ***Changes in Intrafamilial Relationships and The Roles of Women in Japan and Korea***

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## A B S T R A C T

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This study explores changes in familial relations and the roles of women in Japan and Korea primarily by examining changes in attitudes toward intergenerational and conjugal relations in recent years. We first examine women's roles under the traditional family system based on Confucian ideals; we next present an overview of postwar demographic and socioeconomic changes in Japan and Korea. Using these as the bench mark, we then analyze changes in: (1) intergenerational relations in terms of family-size preferences, attitudes toward co-residence with children in old age, and attitudes toward care and support of the elderly parents; and (2) conjugal relations in terms of attitudes toward marriage and divorce, types of marriage, attitudes toward gender division of labor, and housework-sharing patterns.

Our analysis shows substantial changes in many aspects of intra-familial relations and women's roles, although persistence of traditional attitudes are indicated in some others. Large-family norms have become extremely weak, and traditionally strong son preference in Korea seems to have weakened in recent years. Married women's expectation of depending on their children in old age, a normative imperative for women to marry, and a traditional normative orientation toward gender division of labor have all lessened rapidly during the past two decades, whereas permissiveness toward divorce appears to have increased. In contrast, persistence of the traditional familial and gender norms are seen in a strong sense of duty concerning care and support of elderly parents as well as in the importance attached to children in case of possible divorce. Despite a weakening of norms affecting gender division of labor, women in Japan and Korea today still perform a vast majority of the housework and childcare, a finding that indicates little change in actual housework-sharing behavior.

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## I. Introduction

Women's familial roles are influenced by socioeconomic and demographic changes in society at large. Japan and Korea, two cultural offshoots of Confucian China, have evolved some of the most patriarchal family systems and gender-role norms found in modern history (Duhŏn Kim, 1968: 218-221; Chu-Su Kim, 1981: 30-31; Greenhalgh, 1985; Smith, 1987; Fukutake, 1989: 30-31; Lee, 1989: 401-419). However, as a result of extremely rapid fertility declines, coupled with such social structural changes as industrialization, urbanization and modernization after World War II, the social institution of the family has also undergone substantial changes; and these familial changes in turn have altered certain aspects of women's role in the family and people's attitudes toward gender roles in these two East Asian countries.

In this paper we seek to elucidate recent changes in family relations and the roles of women in Japan and Korea by examining and comparing behavioral and attitudinal changes in male-female relationships, particularly in marriage, and intergenerational relationships under conditions of rapid demographic and socioeconomic change. We first look at women's roles as defined and idealized under the traditional family system. We next present an overview of legal, socioeconomic and demographic changes that are considered to have affected familial relations and the roles of women. Using these as the benchmark, we then analyze recent changes in: (1) intergenerational relations in terms of family-size preferences, women's attitudes toward coresidence with children in old age, and attitudes toward care and support of the elderly parents; and (2) relations between men and women as revealed by attitudes toward marriage and divorce, the types of marriage they have, attitudes toward division of labor between the sexes, and housework and childcare sharing. The data for this study are drawn mainly from censuses (and in the case for Japan, vital statistics) as well as from various family-related surveys in the two countries.

## II. The Family System: Traditional Ideals

It is well known that Japan and Korea share the cultural heritage of traditional Chinese Confucianism and therefore have many similarities in their "traditional" family systems, called the ie in Japan and the jib in Korea. By "traditional," we refer to the family system developed in Japan during the period from the 18th century (the middle of the Tokugawa Era) to the end of World War II in 1945, and in Korea from the late 17th century (the latter half of the Yi dynasty, 1392-1910) to the end of the Korean War in 1953.<sup>1</sup> Originally the family system among the upper samurai (warrior) class in Tokugawa Japan, the institution of the ie was adopted by the leaders of the Meiji Restoration as ideal relations that should be extended to the entire population, particularly in rural areas.<sup>2</sup> Thus formulated as the Civil Code of 1896, the ie system came to pervade the prewar Japanese society (Taeuber, 1958: 100-102; Lebra, 1984: 20-24; Fukutake, 1989: 25-27). Similarly in Korea, the jib system was founded on the ideals and practices of the yangban (gentry) class of the Yi dynasty, and became formalized and dominant as the prevailing legal institution in the middle of the dynasty until the end of the Japanese occupation (1910-1945) (Duhŏn Kim, 1968: 319; Roh, 1969; Jaesŏk Ch'oe, 1975; Pak, 1981; Martin, 1990).

The family system in Confucian Japan and Korea was the patriarchal stem family, the basic principles of which were that the eldest son brought his bride into his home and lived with his parents until the parents' death while other offspring formed their own households upon marriage or a short while afterward, and that upon the father's death, the eldest son inherited a major part (or almost all) of the family property and succeeded the family headship (Taeuber, 1958: 100-101; Befu, 1963; Ko et al., 1963; Johnson, 1964; Yim, 1969; Jaesŏk Ch'oe, 1975; Chu-Su Kim, 1981; Pak, 1981; Fukutake, 1989: 25-32; Lee, 1989: 382-400). Therefore, the Japanese ie and the Korean jib were consanguineous or pseudo-consanguineous groups whose basic purpose and function were to preserve biological and cultural continuity of the family based on the patrilineal rules of descent.<sup>3</sup> As idealized principles, the family system was influential not only within the family but also in the society as a whole, providing one of the major bases of cultural and social stability. It shaped human interactions

and relationships, provided a rationale for individual behavior, and thus formulated the basic value orientations of the traditional Japanese and Korean societies called "familism" (Roh, 1969; Yim, 1969; Lee-Jay Cho et al., 1982: 93; Fukutake, 1989: 41-56).

Under this traditional family system, married daughters were excluded from their family of origin (instead, they belonged to the family of procreation), whereas sons, their wives, and their descendants were considered as family members regardless of place of residence. The family head, whose position could be succeeded only by a son, possessed great authority and bore various responsibilities, primarily to secure the continuation of the family line and ensure the practice of filial piety (Taeuber, 1958:100-102; Yim, 1969; Lee, 1989: 302-400). The head managed almost all the family property, dictated marriage and migration decisions of family members, and assumed major responsibility for providing care to elderly parents and performing ancestral worship.

Although the traditional family systems in Japan and Korea possess many similarities as just described, some studies have pointed out dissimilarities, the most distinctive ones being in the degree of importance of the blood line in succession and in the inheritance of property (Duhŏn Kim, 1968: 226-249; Roh, 1969; Jai-Seuk Choi, 1970; Lee, 1989: 382-400). Although the rule of descent was patrilineal and patrilocal in both Japan and Korea, the Korean system put far more emphasis on paternal consanguinity in the succession of the family and its headship. Especially important and "precious" in traditional Korea was the (legitimate) eldest son: his right to succession of the family headship was considered almost absolute, and his status in the family and the society was far superior to that of his brothers and, obviously, his sisters (Chu-Su Kim, 1981; Pak, 1981; Lee-Jay Cho et al., 1982: 93-98; Lee, 1989: 382-400). Thus, far more significance was put on the reproduction of biological sons and if, at worst, such biological replacement of the family failed, a son of the paternal kinship group was to be adopted (Choi, 1970; Lee-Jay Cho et al., 1982: 96-98). This strong emphasis on having a biological male heir is thought to have formed the basis for the strong son preference that still exists in Korea today (Chung et al., 1977; Lee-Jay Cho et al., 1982: 115-125).

In contrast, under the Japanese ie system, if the usual biologi-

cal process of family reproduction failed, adoption was easily accomplished; and the adoption of any male was acceptable, although the choice was frequently the husband of a daughter or a blood relative of the family. Upon adoption, he was given all the rights and obligations of succession and inheritance pertaining to the (future) headship (Taeuber, 1958: 101; Befu, 1963; Lebra, 1984: 20-21; Lee, 1989: 382-400). Moreover, even when a biological son was available, adoption was still possible in Japan if the biological son was judged by the family or head to be incompetent or unworthy. Therefore, the ultimate goal of the Korean family system can be regarded as preservation of the blood line whereas that of the Japanese counterpart seems to have been preservation of the social institution of the ie.

The other important aspect in which the traditional family system in Japan and Korea differed was the rule of inheritance. In both societies, inheritance of the family property and succession of the headship existed side-by-side, complementing each other, the ultimate goal being preservation of the patrilineal family. But whereas primogeniture was predominant in Japan, unequal division of family property among all sons was the rule in Korea with the eldest son being endowed with a major portion (Ko et al., 1963; Duhŏn Kim, 1968: 235-240; Chu-Su Choi, 1970; Lee, 1972, 1989: 382-400; Kim, 1981; Pak, 1981). Here, one thing that was common to both societies was that women, whether married or not, were excluded almost completely from the right of inheritance -- not only in their natal families but also in their families of marriage.

### III. The Roles of Women Under the Traditional Family System

The ie and jib traditional family systems in Japan and Korea both involved a complex series of well-defined hierarchical relations among family members according to the rules of supremacy regarding gender (males over females), generation (parents over children), and birth order (first-born over later-born). Under such systems, overwhelming male dominance was facilitated and perpetuated, with the head and his eldest son at the top of the hierarchy and daughters at the bottom. If the son was married, his young wife occupied the bottom, below the rank of natal daughters (Kim, 1968: 202-204; Lee, 1989: 401-419).

Alluding to this hierarchy, Vogel (1971: 191) called traditional Japan a "land of servitude of the young wife," and Arnous (1894: 156) described young wives in Confucian Korea as "slaves to men and sources of family labor."

In this section, we discuss dominant aspects of the Confucian ideology that defined "ideal" women's roles in the traditional Japanese and Korean societies. In the Confucian view, it was natural as well as virtuous for a woman to obey three men sequentially in her life: her father until marriage; her husband upon marriage; and her son after her husband's death (Yim, 1969; Lee-Jay Cho et al., 1982: 116; Smith, 1987; Lee, 1989: 401-402). To be sure, this was an "ideal" and in actuality many women in traditional Japan and Korea must have been stronger and less obedient than this stereotype. That is thought to have been the case especially for peasant women, as vividly described by Smith (1981) in his portrayal of the Japanese farming village of Suye during the mid-1930s, by Osgood (1951: 47-48) in his portrait of a Korean farming village on the island of Kangwha immediately after World War II, and by Haejoang Cho (1983) in his study of Korean women in Cheju Island. Nevertheless, this "teaching of the three forms of feminine obedience" permeated people's minds through socialization, thus shaping value orientations in the society at large.

For the ultimate goal of continuing patrilineal descent under the ie or the jib, the most important obligation for a woman was to marry and produce a son (Lee, 1989: 409-410). From the standpoint of the woman herself, it was also imperative to marry and bear a son since, being excluded from employment opportunities outside the home and from her natal family upon marriage, the most viable way for her to establish her place and status in the society was to marry and provide an heir to her family of marriage. Moreover, by bearing and rearing a son, a woman could belong to her son's descent line as an ancestor after death, thus even ensuring a resting place of her own soul (Greenhalgh, 1985; Wolf, 1972: 156). Therefore, in the traditional Japanese and Korean societies the status of women had to be "achieved," whereas men's status was predominantly ascribed by virtue of their sex and birth order. And as a means for women to achieve status, Confucian ideology taught them obedience and perseverance.

The patriarchal family system accorded motherhood high respect

(Lee, 1978: 146; Lebra, 1984: 158-161); but the marriage decision, which was a precondition of motherhood, was controlled and decided almost completely by the family head (usually the bride's father), leaving little room for a young woman's preference in mate selection (Osgood, 1951: 103-104; Taeuber, 1958: 207-208; Ko et al., 1963; Kim, 1968: 424-427; Lee-Jay Cho et al., 1982: 96-97).<sup>4</sup> In the traditional Japanese and Korean societies, almost all marriages were arranged through go-betweens who were chosen and delegated authority by the family or head (Lee, 1978: 86-90).

Furthermore, the rules of divorce and remarriage were applied very differently to men and women. Women were not allowed by law or social custom to divorce (or obtain a separation from) their husbands, but men could divorce their wives easily, especially during the early years of marriage.<sup>5</sup> In Korea, for example, men were allowed by law to divorce if a wife had shown insufficient filial piety toward her parents-in-law, failed to bear a son, been unchaste or jealous, contracted a severe disease, been too talkative, or had committed theft (Lee, 1978: 114; Chu-Su Kim, 1981; Lee-Jay Cho et al., 1982: 88). Although these seven grounds for divorce were never strictly enforced (if they had been, a vast majority of wives would have been divorced), the most important obligations of filial piety and reproduction seem to have been rather strictly enforced because infecundity and conflicts between wives and their mothers-in-law were the most frequently cited reasons of divorcing or deserting wives both in Korea and Japan (Vogel, 1971: 204-205; Lee, 1978: 114-123; Lee-Jay Cho et al., 1982: 98). Therefore, women in traditional Japan and Korea had little influence over decisions on the formation and dissolution of their own marriages. Rather, decision making was the prerogative of the family head, and it was carried out for the purpose of giving continuity to the patrilineal family line.

Among all intrafamilial relations under the ie or the jib, parent-child relationships occupied the pivotal position and conjugal relationships assumed the subordinate one. Moreover, interactions between husband and wife (and between men and women in general) were restricted and reserved, an open show of affection being prohibited. Concomitantly, norms pertaining to segregation between husband and wife were so extensive that spouses' respective domains in the home were regarded as completely separate: the external world for the

husband and the "kitchen" for the wife (Vogel, 1971: 181-182; Lee-Jay Cho et al., 1982: 98). Wives actually helped their husbands a great deal economically; especially in agriculture and family businesses the contributions of wives as workers were indispensable. Nevertheless, the society regarded their economic role as secondary and the "kitchen" as exclusively the wife's domain. The terminology widely applied to wives in Japan today is derived from the women's traditional role: husbands commonly introduce their wives to others as their kanai (literally, inside of the house), and friends and neighbors call wives okusan (literally, a person in the back of the house). Similarly, in Korea today husbands introduce their wives to others as anhae or ansaram, both of which literally mean "person inside."

Under this ideal of strict division of labor at home, what came to be emphasized in Japan during the Meiji period (1868-1912) as the proper role for adult women was the dual one of "good wife and wise mother." Although this notion is commonly assumed to be Confucian in origin, it is not; rather, it is the "Japanized" version of the 19th-century Western notion of female domesticity characterized by the expression "the betterhalf" (Kamishima, 1969: 202-209; Smith, 1987). And it is thought to have spread in Korea during the Japanese occupation (1910-1945).<sup>6</sup> Regardless of its origin, what is important is that this "ideal" advocated for women a subordinate position in the family and society, to help her husband in any way possible, and as mother to provide good care for the children. Thus the ideal facilitated and strengthened the gender division of labor in a way that served men's convenience.

Another important role assigned to women in traditional Japan and Korea was that of the dutiful daughter-in-law who helped her husband practice his obligation of filial piety. For women, fulfillment of this role meant, among other things, that they provided care and support to their parents-in-law in old age. Moreover, while wives were expected to obey their in-laws and to develop "harmonious" relationships with them through one-sided subordination, the strain caused by this excessive demand for submission fomented conflicts, both covert and overt, between wives and their mothers-in-law, and it remains one of the major intrafamilial problems in present-day Japan and Korea (Lee, 1978: 188-190; Vogel, 1971: 203-205; Lebra, 1984: 141-145).

In contrast to the strong emphasis put on women's domestic roles of wife, mother, and daughter-in-law, little attention was paid to their multifunctional economic role: their labor in the household, organization of consumption, and assistance in economic activities that brought income or other benefits to the family. In prewar Japan and Korea, which were largely agricultural, an intimate relationship existed between household work and labor outside the home. Under such economic conditions, women's labor was indispensable to the family's maintenance.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, it was extremely difficult, both economically and culturally, for married women to obtain employment outside the home, in part because wives were expected to supply labor for their husbands' families, and also because household chores and economic activities outside the home required women's toil.

In sum, the traditional family system in Japan and Korea developed mechanisms under which intrafamilial relations were intricately organized and the roles of women were carefully prescribed, thus making women contribute to the perpetuation of the patriarchal system itself. This system constrained the lives of individuals, especially *those of women, leaving few opportunities for life outside the matrix of family relations.* There was no defined place in traditional Japanese and Korean society for women to live or function on their own.

#### IV. Legal, Socioeconomic, and Demographic Changes After World War II

The laws in prewar Japan and Korea reinforced the subordinate roles of women by providing the legal justification for continuing the patriarchal family system. The brutal discrimination against women was considerably remedied after World War II, however. Japan's surrender to the Allied Powers in 1945 marked the end of Imperial Japan. A new constitution was adopted, and the civil code was revised under the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. These dramatic legal changes made individualism rather than familism the basic framework of law, and established the legal principle of equality between the sexes, thus dismantling the *ie* system. Legal changes stated in the revised civil code that are thought to be most directly related to the family and women's status are that: marriage (other

than that of minors) is subject to the wishes of the individual couples involved; conjugal relations are those of mutuality between couples living together, cooperating with and aiding each other; married women are given rights to their separate property; and wives are entitled to receive a minimum share of one-third (later, revised to one-half) of the estate of their deceased spouses, with all children being entitled equally to the remainder.<sup>8</sup>

In Korea, the end of World War II signified liberation from the Japanese occupation that had lasted from 1910 to 1945.<sup>9</sup> In 1948, shortly after liberation, Korea's new constitution went into effect, declaring democracy and equality as basic human principles. However, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 again put the country into political and socioeconomic upheaval, and consequently the passage of a new civil code was delayed until 1957 (Chu-Su Kim, 1981; Pak, 1981). Under the civil code of 1957, although women's legal rights and status were improved over those in prewar years, many aspects of traditional Confucian principles survived, such as male supremacy and the importance of patrilineal rules of descent (Chu-Su Kim, 1981; Pak, 1981). As a result of protests by liberal intellectuals and women's organizations against the code's conservative provisions, it was revised in 1977, to permit marriage based on the wishes of individual couples without parental consent, divorce by agreement between husband and wife, and more shares for daughters and wives in inheritance (Chu-Su Kim, 1981; Pak, 1981). Nevertheless, although the legal position of Korean women has improved substantially in postwar years, equality between the sexes remains unrealized even under the new civil code of 1991 and reforms in other family-related laws.<sup>10</sup>

The legal reforms have undoubtedly contributed to recent changes in intrafamilial relations and women's roles, but much stronger and more pervasive influences were exerted on the family by the rapid socioeconomic and demographic changes that took place in the two countries after World War II. In the following two subsections, we look at those changes in detail.

### Socioeconomic Changes

As is well known, Japan experienced extremely rapid economic growth between the early 1950s and the early 1970s. By 1952, when the World War II Peace Treaty went into effect, Japan had embarked on a

course of reconstruction and subsequent rapid growth. For example, per capita GNP (at constant prices) doubled during 1955-63, and then it doubled again in the eight years from 1963 to 1971 (Nakamura, 1981: 49-63). In Korea, after a period of political and social instability following the Korean War, the country managed by the early 1960s to develop sound economic policies and an industrial structure with the help of massive foreign aid (Lee, 1972). As a result, Korea's production and exports increased dramatically in the 1960s and afterward, and per capita GNP (at constant prices) tripled between 1962 and 1980 (Korea Economic Planning Board, 1981: 3). Currently Korea belongs to a group of newly industrializing economies (NIES) and Japan is the world's wealthiest nation.

In the course of its rapid economic development during the 1950s and 1960s, Japan also experienced rapid urbanization. As shown in Table 1, by 1975 more than 75 percent of the Japanese population was residing in urban areas (shi-bu), primarily as a result of a large population influx from rural agricultural regions to the three major metropolitan regions of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya (Tsuya and Kuroda, 1989). Whereas Japan's urbanization slowed down in the 1970s and almost stopped in the 1980s after having achieved one of the world's highest levels (approximately 77 percent in 1985), Korea has experienced continuous urbanization since the prewar years.<sup>11</sup> Although Korea's level of urbanization was initially much lower than Japan's, it is quickly catching up with Japan owing to its on-going and rapid urban concentration of population since the 1960s.

Concomitantly with their rapid economic development and urbanization, Japan and Korea both experienced dramatic changes in their industrial structures, namely, rapid shifts of the agricultural population to secondary and tertiary industries (see Table 1). Japan's agricultural population, which composed almost half of its total population immediately after the war, shrank to almost one-tenth by 1980, thus making the country predominantly nonagricultural. Korea's population has remained much more agricultural than Japan's and the onset of industrialization was later in Korea than in Japan, but the pace of Korea's industrialization has been similarly rapid: the proportion of the population that was engaged in agriculture decreased

from 66 percent in 1960 to 25 percent by 1985, completing the industrial transformation from an agricultural to a nonagricultural economy.

Table 1. Selected Socioeconomic Indicators: Japan and Korea

| Indicator   | Japan  | Korea |
|---|--------|-------|
| Percentage urban  |        |       |
| 1935  | 33     | 9*    |
| 1950  | 37     | 21    |
| 1960  | 63     | 28    |
| 1970  | 72     | 41    |
| 1975  | 76     | 48    |
| 1980  | 76     | 57    |
| 1985  | 77     | 65    |
| Percentage of employed population working in primary industry |        |       |
| 1930  | 50     | 82    |
| 1950  | 48     | --    |
| 1960  | 33     | 66    |
| 1970  | 19     | 51    |
| 1975  | 14     | 46    |
| 1980  | 11     | 34    |
| 1985  | 9      | 25    |
| Female life expectancy at birth                               |        |       |
| 1935  | 49.6** | 41.7# |
| 1950  | 63.0## | 49.0  |
| 1960  | 70.2   | 56.9  |
| 1970  | 74.7   | 59.4  |
| 1975  | 76.9   | 64.0  |
| 1980  | 78.8   | 68.8  |
| 1985  | 80.5   | 71.0  |

NOTES: \* Including all administrative cities and towns with populations of 20,000.  
 \*\* Figure for 1935-36.  
 # Figure for 1935-40.  
 ## Figure for 1950-52.

SOURCES: Institute of Population Problems, Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare (1990) Latest Demographic Statistics 1989; National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning Board (1989) Outline and Major Results of the 1985 Population & Housing Census in the Republic of Korea; Kwon, Tai Hwan, Hae Young Lee, Yunshik Chang and Eui-Young Yu (1975) The Population of Korea. Seoul: Seoul National University; Kwon, Tai Hwan (1977) Demography of Korea. Seoul: Seoul National University.

Owing to the rapid economic and medical development in postwar years, Japan and Korea experienced notable improvements in health. As shown in Table 1, life expectancy at birth for Japanese women increased from 63 years in 1950 to over 80 years in 1985, making Japan the world's longest living population. Although Korea's mortality level is considerably higher than Japan's, its improvement is impressive: women's life expectancy at birth was 49 years in 1950 but increased to 71 years by 1985.

These macro social-structural changes profoundly affected not only the family system but also the roles that women play at home and in society. Rapid industrialization and subsequent restructuring of the industries caused the breakdown of the agricultural family economy and the old ie and jib systems. These socioeconomic changes in turn allowed, and almost necessitated, women's educational attainment and labor force participation outside the home.

Tables 2 and 3 show women's educational levels by age in Japan and Korea, respectively, for three postwar years. We can first see from Table 2 that the educational level of Japanese women was already quite high in the prewar period, as indicated by the high prevalence of primary and junior high school education among women of ages 35 and above in 1960. What is notable in the postwar years is the rapidly growing prevalence of high school education, and then of university-level education. In 1980, more than one-fourth of Japanese women in their twenties were graduates of a junior college or university.

In clear contrast to Japan, we can see from Table 3 that Korean women suffered from a lack of formal education throughout the prewar years. Illiteracy was especially rampant among women who spent their childhood during the Yi dynasty (i.e., before the Japanese occupation in 1910), and it is thought to be due to the exclusion of women from all formal educational institutions during the dynasty (Lee-Jay Cho et al., 1982: 116). As a result, female education in those days was conducted at home, and daughters who benefited from opportunities of even such informal learning were few in rural areas (Osgood, 1951: 100). After 1910, women's formal education began to spread slowly, and after World War II the spread of primary and junior-high-school education accelerated, as shown by large age differentials in the proportion of women with no formal education among women aged 40-44 and younger in 1966. Further educational gains have been made by

Table 2. Percentage Distribution of Women's Educational Levels by Age: Japan, 1960, 1970 and 1980

| Year and age group | Completed           |             |                  | In school | No formal education | Total |
|--------------------|---------------------|-------------|------------------|-----------|---------------------|-------|
|                    | Junior high or less | High school | Univer-<br>sity* |           |                     |       |
| 1960               |                     |             |                  |           |                     |       |
| Total              | 64.9                | 23.4        | 2.2              | 6.1       | 3.4                 | 100.0 |
| 15-19              | 45.0                | 12.2        | ---              | 42.7      | 0.2                 | 100.0 |
| 20-24              | 56.9                | 36.8        | 3.9              | 2.1       | 0.2                 | 100.0 |
| 25-29              | 60.1                | 35.8        | 4.3              | 0.1       | 0.2                 | 100.0 |
| 30-34              | 59.6                | 36.6        | 3.5              | 0.0       | 0.3                 | 100.0 |
| 35-39              | 69.0                | 27.8        | 2.6              | 0.0       | 0.5                 | 100.0 |
| 40-44              | 74.1                | 23.2        | 1.9              | 0.0       | 0.8                 | 100.0 |
| 45-49              | 75.7                | 21.3        | 1.8              | 0.0       | 1.2                 | 100.0 |
| 50-54              | 78.6                | 17.6        | 1.8              | 0.0       | 2.0                 | 100.0 |
| 55-59              | 83.4                | 12.2        | 0.9              | 0.0       | 3.5                 | 100.0 |
| 60-64              | 84.0                | 9.5         | 0.6              | 0.0       | 5.9                 | 100.0 |
| 65+                | 66.9                | 4.5         | 0.4              | 0.0       | 28.0                | 100.0 |
| 1970               |                     |             |                  |           |                     |       |
| Total              | 54.0                | 31.9        | 5.0              | 7.9       | 1.1                 | 100.0 |
| 15-19              | 19.5                | 16.7        | ---              | 63.6      | 0.2                 | 100.0 |
| 20-24              | 30.7                | 52.3        | 10.8             | 6.0       | 0.2                 | 100.0 |
| 25-29              | 42.0                | 47.9        | 9.7              | 0.2       | 0.2                 | 100.0 |
| 30-34              | 50.7                | 42.2        | 6.7              | 0.1       | 0.2                 | 100.0 |
| 35-39              | 55.7                | 39.0        | 5.1              | 0.0       | 0.2                 | 100.0 |
| 40-44              | 58.5                | 36.5        | 4.6              | 0.0       | 0.3                 | 100.0 |
| 45-49              | 68.9                | 26.8        | 3.8              | 0.0       | 0.4                 | 100.0 |
| 50-54              | 74.7                | 22.0        | 2.7              | 0.0       | 0.5                 | 100.0 |
| 55-59              | 76.9                | 19.4        | 2.7              | 0.0       | 0.9                 | 100.0 |
| 60-64              | 80.3                | 15.3        | 2.7              | 0.0       | 1.6                 | 100.0 |
| 65+                | 82.0                | 8.6         | 1.3              | 0.0       | 7.8                 | 100.0 |
| 1980               |                     |             |                  |           |                     |       |
| Total              | 40.5                | 40.4        | 10.2             | 8.2       | 0.5                 | 100.0 |
| 15-19              | 4.5                 | 14.2        | ---              | 81.2      | 0.1                 | 100.0 |
| 20-24              | 8.1                 | 51.6        | 27.6             | 12.4      | 0.1                 | 100.0 |
| 25-29              | 16.9                | 56.9        | 25.6             | 0.3       | 0.1                 | 100.0 |
| 30-34              | 24.7                | 57.6        | 17.3             | 0.1       | 0.1                 | 100.0 |
| 35-39              | 35.9                | 53.0        | 10.8             | 0.0       | 0.1                 | 100.0 |
| 40-44              | 44.5                | 47.7        | 7.5              | 0.0       | 0.2                 | 100.0 |
| 45-49              | 49.7                | 44.6        | 5.5              | 0.0       | 0.2                 | 100.0 |
| 50-54              | 54.1                | 40.7        | 4.9              | 0.0       | 0.2                 | 100.0 |
| 55-59              | 65.0                | 30.5        | 4.0              | 0.0       | 0.3                 | 100.0 |
| 60-64              | 70.7                | 25.8        | 2.7              | 0.0       | 0.5                 | 100.0 |
| 65+                | 77.5                | 17.4        | 2.3              | 0.0       | 2.4                 | 100.0 |

NOTE: \* Including graduates from junior colleges.

SOURCES: Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Japan, Population Census of Japan, various years.

Table 3. Percentage Distribution of Women's Educational Levels by Age: Korea, 1966, 1980, and 1985

|       | Completed           |             |                  | In school | No formal education |              |
|-------|---------------------|-------------|------------------|-----------|---------------------|--------------|
|       | Junior high or less | High school | Univer-<br>sity* |           | Total               | (Illiterate) |
| 1966  |                     |             |                  |           |                     |              |
| Total | 48.5                | 6.0         | 0.9              | 6.1       | 38.6                | (22.2)       |
| 13-19 | 65.3                | 2.9         | 0.0              | 26.9      | 4.9                 | (2.1)        |
| 20-24 | 74.2                | 11.8        | 2.1              | 2.6       | 9.3                 | (3.3)        |
| 25-29 | 70.6                | 9.3         | 2.5              | 0.1       | 17.5                | (6.8)        |
| 30-34 | 62.4                | 6.5         | 1.4              | 0.0       | 29.7                | (12.1)       |
| 35-39 | 43.4                | 10.5        | 0.8              | 0.0       | 45.2                | (19.9)       |
| 40-44 | 32.3                | 6.7         | 0.5              | 0.0       | 60.5                | (28.7)       |
| 45-49 | 23.6                | 4.1         | 0.4              | 0.0       | 71.9                | (38.1)       |
| 50-54 | 17.0                | 2.8         | 0.3              | 0.0       | 79.9                | (47.5)       |
| 55-59 | 11.1                | 1.8         | 0.2              | 0.0       | 86.9                | (58.2)       |
| 60-64 | 6.4                 | 0.9         | 0.1              | 0.0       | 92.5                | (68.9)       |
| 65+   | 2.7                 | 0.4         | 0.1              | 0.0       | 96.8                | (81.2)       |
| 1980  |                     |             |                  |           |                     |              |
| Total | 52.6                | 15.9        | 3.1              | 9.9       | 18.5                |              |
| 15-19 | 34.5                | 10.3        | 0.0              | 54.7      | 0.5                 |              |
| 20-24 | 54.7                | 34.5        | 4.4              | 5.7       | 0.7                 |              |
| 25-29 | 62.6                | 28.3        | 7.6              | 0.2       | 1.3                 |              |
| 30-34 | 69.0                | 21.3        | 6.7              | 0.0       | 3.0                 |              |
| 35-39 | 73.7                | 14.8        | 4.6              | 0.0       | 6.9                 |              |
| 40-44 | 73.2                | 10.3        | 2.7              | 0.0       | 13.8                |              |
| 45-49 | 65.1                | 7.6         | 1.5              | 0.0       | 25.8                |              |
| 50-54 | 51.4                | 4.6         | 1.0              | 0.0       | 43.0                |              |
| 55-59 | 37.6                | 2.4         | 0.6              | 0.0       | 59.4                |              |
| 60+   | 16.8                | 0.8         | 0.3              | 0.0       | 82.0                |              |
| 1985  |                     |             |                  |           |                     |              |
| Total | 45.0                | 22.6        | 4.9              | 12.9      | 14.7                |              |
| 15-19 | 13.9                | 11.5        | 0.0              | 74.3      | 0.2                 |              |
| 20-24 | 32.1                | 46.2        | 8.1              | 13.3      | 0.3                 |              |
| 25-29 | 46.8                | 41.5        | 10.2             | 1.0       | 0.5                 |              |
| 30-34 | 58.7                | 31.6        | 8.5              | 0.1       | 1.1                 |              |
| 35-39 | 66.3                | 24.0        | 7.0              | 0.0       | 2.7                 |              |
| 40-44 | 72.1                | 16.2        | 4.7              | 0.0       | 6.9                 |              |
| 45-49 | 72.1                | 11.3        | 2.8              | 0.0       | 13.8                |              |
| 50-54 | 63.4                | 7.8         | 1.6              | 0.0       | 27.2                |              |
| 55-59 | 49.5                | 4.8         | 1.0              | 0.0       | 44.7                |              |
| 60+   | 22.5                | 1.5         | 0.4              | 0.0       | 75.5                |              |

NOTE: \* Including graduates from junior colleges.

SOURCES: National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning Board, Republic of Korea, Population and Housing Census Report, various years.

Korean women in recent years: the proportion of women with a high school education increased significantly during the 1970s and early 1980s, and the proportion of young women with a university education grew rapidly between 1980 and 1985. Judging from these recent trends, it is expected that female educational levels will further increase in Japan and Korea in the years to come.

Another change in the socioeconomic characteristics of women that is closely associated with changes in intrafamilial relations and women's roles is in the type and age pattern of women's labor force participation. Before World War II in Japan and before 1970 in Korea, women's labor was largely agricultural. However, the rapid industrialization that took place in these countries transformed the female labor structure to paid employment outside the home. As for the age pattern of female labor force participation, from Table 4 we first notice that Japan and Korea both have an M-shaped pattern, implying the tendency for women to pull out of the labor force temporarily for childbearing and childcare. Another noticeable feature is the rapid decline in the rate of labor force participation among teenage females in the two countries, which is probably due to increasing educational attainment. The rates for Japanese women aged 20 and above increased slowly, though steadily, beginning in the mid-1970s, whereas in Korea the rate for women aged 20-24 increased continuously in the postwar years and that for women aged 35 and above rose from the mid-1960s to 1980. These findings imply a growing trend in recent years in female labor force participation (that is, in paid employment outside the home) during the period between women's completion of education and their marriage or first birth, and also a return to the labor force after completion of childrearing. Moreover, the duration of women's temporary withdrawal from the labor force has been substantially shortened as a result of the rapid fertility decline, to which we turn in the following subsection.

### Demographic Changes

Japan experienced an unprecedentedly rapid fertility decline immediately after World War II, cutting its birth rate by half in the space of a decade. The total fertility rate (TFR) decreased from 4.54 in 1947 to 2.04 children per woman in 1957 (see Table 5). From the late 1950s onward, the birth rate remained low and relatively stable

until it started to decline slowly again to a below-replacement level in the mid-1970s. Since Japan's fertility decline started before the period of rapid economic growth, it is reasonable to assume that Japan's postwar development was due at least in part to the dramatic fertility decline.

In Korea, in contrast, high fertility persisted until the country started to experience rapid economic development, urbanization, and industrialization in the early 1960s. In 1962, Korea's ambitious national family planning program was launched (Choe and Park, 1989). Afterward, fertility declined quickly and steadily, the TFR dropping by almost three-fourths in 24 years, from 5.89 in 1963 to 1.55 in 1987. We can therefore conclude that Korea has caught up with Japan in its fertility transition after a dramatic and continuous fertility decline for the past 25 years.

Table 4. Female Labor Force Participation Rates by Age: Japan and Korea

| Country and year | 15-19 | 20-24 | 25-29 | 30-34 | 35-39 | 40-44                     | 45-49 |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------------------------|-------|
| JAPAN            |       |       |       |       |       |                           |       |
| 1960             | 49.0  | 70.8  | 54.5  | 56.5  | 59.0  | --- 59.0 <sup>#</sup> --- |       |
| 1965             | 35.8  | 70.2  | 49.0  | 51.1  | 59.6  | --- 60.2 <sup>#</sup> --- |       |
| 1970             | 33.6  | 70.6  | 45.5  | 48.2  | 57.5  | 62.8                      | 63.0  |
| 1975             | 21.7  | 66.2  | 42.6  | 43.9  | 54.0  | 59.9                      | 61.5  |
| 1980             | 18.5  | 70.0  | 49.2  | 48.2  | 58.0  | 64.1                      | 64.4  |
| 1985             | 16.6  | 71.9  | 54.1  | 50.6  | 60.0  | 67.9                      | 68.1  |
| 1988             | 16.5  | 73.7  | 58.2  | 50.9  | 61.3  | 68.1                      | 69.3  |
| KOREA            |       |       |       |       |       |                           |       |
| 1966             | 38.8  | 41.3  | 31.8  | 35.3  | 43.6  | 49.0                      | 46.9  |
| 1970             | 43.7  | 42.0  | 30.9  | 38.6  | 44.8  | 49.8                      | 50.2  |
| 1975             | 36.9  | 44.0  | 29.2  | 36.4  | 48.9  | 53.6                      | 53.5  |
| 1980             | 30.9  | 49.2  | 30.5  | 41.8  | 56.0  | 60.8                      | 64.6  |
| 1984             | 19.1  | 49.0  | 31.8  | 38.7  | 50.4  | 59.2                      | 60.4  |

NOTE: # Rate for women aged 40-54.

SOURCES: Office of Labor Affairs, Republic of Korea. Yearbook of Labour Statistics. various years; National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning Board, Republic of Korea. Population and Housing Census Report. various years; Office of Women's Affairs, Japan Ministry of Labor (1989) Fujin Rodou no Jitsujo (Current Conditions of Female Labor).

Table 5. Total Fertility Rates in Japan and Korea, 1947-88

| Year | Japan | Korea  |
|------|-------|--------|
| 1947 | 4.54  | 5.96*  |
| 1950 | 3.65  | 5.60** |
| 1955 | 2.37  | 5.46   |
| 1956 | 2.22  | 5.33   |
| 1957 | 2.04  | 5.40   |
| 1958 | 2.11  | 5.94   |
| 1959 | 2.04  | 5.98   |
| 1960 | 2.00  | 5.98   |
| 1961 | 1.96  | 6.02   |
| 1962 | 1.98  | 5.85   |
| 1963 | 2.00  | 5.89   |
| 1964 | 2.05  | 5.23   |
| 1965 | 2.14  | 4.95   |
| 1966 | 1.58  | 4.84   |
| 1967 | 2.23  | 4.50   |
| 1968 | 2.13  | 4.66   |
| 1969 | 2.13  | 4.54   |
| 1970 | 2.13  | 4.47   |
| 1971 | 2.16  | 4.54   |
| 1972 | 2.14  | 4.41   |
| 1973 | 2.14  | 4.01   |
| 1974 | 2.05  | 3.75   |
| 1975 | 1.91  | 3.33   |
| 1976 | 1.85  | 3.00   |
| 1977 | 1.80  | 2.94   |
| 1978 | 1.79  | 2.74   |
| 1979 | 1.77  | 2.83   |
| 1980 | 1.75  | 2.71   |
| 1981 | 1.74  | 2.64   |
| 1982 | 1.77  | 2.37   |
| 1983 | 1.80  | 2.09   |
| 1984 | 1.81  | 1.80   |
| 1985 | 1.76  | 1.70   |
| 1986 | 1.72  | 1.62   |
| 1987 | 1.69  | 1.55   |
| 1988 | 1.66  | 1.66   |

NOTES: \* Rate for 1945-50.  
 \*\* Rate for 1950-55.

SOURCES: Kwon Tai Hwan (1977) Demography of Korea. Seoul: Seoul National University; Coale, Ansley J., Lee-Jay Cho and Noreen Goldman (1980) Estimation of Recent Trends in Fertility and Mortality in the Republic of Korea. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences; National Bureau of Statistics (1989) Outline and Major Results of the 1985 Population & Housing Census in the Republic of Korea; Institute of Population Problems, Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare (1990) Latest Demographic Statistics 1989.

Turning to changes in the age pattern of fertility underlying these rapid fertility declines in Japan and Korea, we can see from Table 6 that the age pattern shifted from prolonged childbearing to curtailment of childbearing long before the onset of natural sterility. Another notable change is a major fertility decline for women aged 20-24 in the two countries, and also for women aged 15-19 in Korea, which was due probably to the delay of first marriages. In addition, after the fertility level declined to a below-replacement level (in the mid-1970s in Japan and in the early 1980s in Korea), the fertility of women in their reproductive prime (i.e., those aged 25-29) decreased sharply to very low levels.

Therefore, changes in women's reproductive process in Japan and Korea can be summarized as follows: the overall fertility levels declined dramatically first in Japan and then in Korea, achieving a below-replacement fertility in recent years; the beginning of women's reproductive careers has been delayed because of the increasing postponement of first marriages; and the span of childbearing years has been greatly shortened during the rapid fertility decline.

A major proximate determinant of these rapid fertility declines in Japan and Korea after World War II is the changing age structure of first marriage. From Table 7, we can see dramatic decreases in the proportion ever married among Japanese women in their twenties in the postwar years, and even among those aged 30-34 after the mid-1970s. Similar declines in the proportion ever married among women in their early twenties are seen in Korea as well. However, the degree of decline for women aged 25-29 was considerably less there than in Japan and the proportions for women aged 30 or older did not decrease substantially. These changes in the age pattern of marriage indicate increasing postponement of first marriages in the two countries, as reflected in increases in the singulate mean age at first marriage. In addition, compared with Korea, in Japan marriage appears to be less universal because the proportion never married by age 50 has been in the range of 4-5 percent in Japan since 1970 whereas almost 99 percent of Korean women were married by age 40 even in the 1980s.

Finally, we consider household structural changes in this subsection. As shown in Table 8, the average household size has been declining in both Japan and Korea since World War II: from 5.0 persons in 1950 to 3.2 persons in 1985 for Japan, and from 5.6 persons in 1960

Table 6. Age-Specific Fertility Rates per 1,000 Women: Japan and Korea

| Year  | 15-19 | 20-24 | 25-29 | 30-34 | 35-39 | 40-44 | 45-49 |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| JAPAN |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 1950  | 13    | 161   | 236   | 174   | 104   | 36    | 2     |
| 1955  | 6     | 112   | 181   | 112   | 49    | 13    | 1     |
| 1960  | 4     | 106   | 181   | 80    | 24    | 5     | 0     |
| 1965  | 3     | 112   | 203   | 86    | 19    | 3     | 0     |
| 1970  | 4     | 96    | 208   | 85    | 20    | 3     | 0     |
| 1975  | 4     | 106   | 188   | 69    | 15    | 2     | 0     |
| 1980  | 4     | 77    | 182   | 73    | 13    | 2     | 0     |
| 1985  | 4     | 62    | 178   | 85    | 18    | 2     | 0     |
| 1989  | 4     | 47    | 146   | 92    | 20    | 2     | 0     |
| KOREA |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 1955  | 39    | 240   | 288   | 245   | 184   | 82    | 14    |
| 1960  | 35    | 249   | 323   | 273   | 204   | 96    | 16    |
| 1966  | 22    | 213   | 310   | 219   | 136   | 59    | 9     |
| 1970  | 17    | 190   | 315   | 211   | 113   | 43    | 6     |
| 1975  | 14    | 163   | 268   | 140   | 59    | 19    | 3     |
| 1980  | 10    | 155   | 248   | 97    | 26    | 6     | 1     |
| 1985  | 6     | 116   | 169   | 42    | 9     | 2     | 0     |

SOURCES: Coale, Ansley, Lee-Jay Cho and Norleen Goldman (1980) Estimation of Recent Trends in Fertility and Mortality in the Republic of Korea. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences; National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning Board (1989) Outline and Major Results of the 1985 Population & Housing Census in the Republic of Korea; Institute of Population Problems, Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare (1990) Latest Demographic Statistics 1989.

Table 7. Proportions of Women Ever Married by Age and Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (SMAM) in Japan, 1950-89, and Korea, 1955-85

| Year              | 15-19 | 20-24 | 25-29 | 30-34 | 35-39 | 40-44 | 45-49 | SMAM |
|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| JAPAN             |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |      |
| 1950              | 3.4   | 44.7  | 84.8  | 94.3  | 97.0  | 98.0  | 98.5  | 23.6 |
| 1955              | 1.7   | 33.5  | 79.4  | 92.1  | 96.1  | 97.7  | 98.3  | 24.6 |
| 1960              | 1.3   | 31.6  | 78.8  | 90.4  | 94.4  | 96.9  | 98.1  | 25.0 |
| 1965              | 1.5   | 31.9  | 81.8  | 90.9  | 93.2  | 95.3  | 97.0  | 24.7 |
| 1970              | 2.2   | 28.4  | 81.9  | 92.8  | 94.2  | 94.7  | 96.0  | 24.5 |
| 1975              | 1.4   | 30.8  | 79.1  | 92.3  | 94.7  | 95.0  | 95.1  | 24.3 |
| 1980              | 1.0   | 22.3  | 76.0  | 90.9  | 94.5  | 95.6  | 95.6  | 25.1 |
| 1985              | 1.1   | 18.6  | 69.4  | 89.6  | 93.4  | 95.1  | 95.7  | 25.8 |
| 1989              | 0.6   | 14.3  | 62.7  | 80.0  | 93.4  | 95.0  | 96.5  | 26.7 |
| REPUBLIC OF KOREA |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |      |
| 1955              | 14.8  | 79.2  | 97.0  | 99.3  | 99.7  | 99.7  | 99.8  | 20.5 |
| 1960              | 7.3   | 66.5  | 97.1  | 99.6  | 99.8  | 99.9  | 99.9  | 21.5 |
| 1966              | 3.9   | 48.4  | 92.3  | 99.0  | 99.7  | 99.9  | 99.9  | 22.8 |
| 1970              | 2.9   | 42.8  | 90.3  | 98.6  | 99.5  | 99.8  | 99.9  | 23.3 |
| 1975              | 2.6   | 37.5  | 88.2  | 97.9  | 99.3  | 99.7  | 99.8  | 23.7 |
| 1980              | 1.8   | 33.9  | 85.9  | 97.3  | 99.0  | 99.5  | 99.7  | 24.1 |
| 1985              | 0.9   | 27.9  | 81.6  | 95.8  | 98.4  | 99.3  | 99.6  | 24.7 |

SOURCES: Kwon, Tai Hwan, Hae Young Lee, Yunshik Chang and Eui-Young Yu (1975) The Population of Korea. Seoul: Seoul National University; National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning Board, Republic of Korea, Population and Housing Census Report, various years; Bureau of Statistics, Management and Coordination Agency, Population Census of Japan, various years.

to 4.2 persons in 1985 for Korea. We also notice from Table 8 that Japan experienced a considerable decrease in the proportion of stem-family households (defined as households in which married couples coreside with their parents, with or without children), and that a similar decline happened in Korea during the 1960s and early 1970s. This change implies a declining tendency for young couples to coreside with parents in the two countries during the recent period of rapid socioeconomic development.<sup>12</sup> A further analysis of the Japanese data indicates that this decline in the proportion of stem-family households was due mainly to a decrease in the proportion of households in which married couples lived with both parents, and that decrease in turn implies a declining tendency for young couples to coreside with parents in Japan especially when both parents were alive. A similar analysis of the Korea data reveals that the decline there was due primarily to an overall decrease in the proportion of households in which married couples coresided with parents, regardless of whether both parents were alive or not.<sup>13</sup>

A declining tendency for young couples to coreside with the husband's parents is also indicated by findings from studies on post-nuptial coresidence in Japan and Korea. For example, according to Atoh (1988), among Japanese eldest sons who married in 1960-64, 58 percent lived with their parents immediately after marriage whereas only 41 percent of eldest sons who married in 1980-82 did so. Similarly, findings from the 1989 Survey of Family Roles in Korea indicate that, when parental mortality was controlled, 72 percent of women aged 50-59 had lived with their husbands' parents upon marriage whereas only 44 percent of women aged 30-39 had done so (Kong et al., 1990: 104). Because of declining fertility and mortality, the probabilities for their husbands to be eldest sons and for their husbands' parents to be alive were both expected to be increasing. Given the increasing demographic availability of an eldest son and his parents to form a stem family, this recent decline in postnuptial coresidence in Korea implies even a greater departure from the traditionally ideal pattern of patrilineal and patrilocal coresidence.

Table 8. Selected Indicators of Household Changes: Japan and Korea

| Indicator and year                    | Japan | Korea  |
|---------------------------------------|-------|--------|
| Mean number of persons per household  |       |        |
| 1920                                  | 4.9   | 5.3    |
| 1930                                  | 5.0   | 5.3    |
| 1950                                  | 5.0   | --     |
| 1960                                  | 4.5   | 5.6    |
| 1970                                  | 3.7   | 5.2    |
| 1975                                  | 3.4   | 5.1    |
| 1980                                  | 3.3   | 4.6    |
| 1985                                  | 3.2   | 4.2    |
| Percentage of stem-family households* |       |        |
| 1960                                  | 23.1  | --     |
| 1965                                  | 21.3  | 22.9** |
| 1970                                  | 14.9  | 19.2   |
| 1975                                  | 14.3  | 11.9   |
| 1980                                  | 14.6  | 10.9   |
| 1985                                  | 14.2  | 10.2   |

NOTES: \* Percentage of households in which married couples living with parent(s), with or without children, among total ordinary households.

\*\* Rate for 1966.

SOURCES: Institute of Population Problems, Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare (1990) Latest Demographic Statistics 1989; National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning Board (1989) Outline and Major Results of the 1985 Population & Housing Census in the Republic of Korea; Kim, Yun (1966) The Population of Korea 1910-1945. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. Australian National University.

## V. Changes in Attitudes toward Intrafamilial Relations and Women's Roles

In the previous section, we found that social structures and demographic patterns in Japan and Korea underwent dramatic changes after World War II. It is widely assumed that these changes in the objective spheres of the society are bound to affect norms, attitudes and value orientations concerning intrafamilial relations and women's roles. In this section, we examine not only how familial relations and women's roles have changed, but also which aspects of familial traditions changed most rapidly and which were most resilient, by focusing on attitudes toward two major aspects of intrafamilial relationships: intergenerational (vertical) relations and conjugal (horizontal) relations. Specifically, we explore changes in attitudes toward intergenerational relations by examining: (1) family-size attitudes as expressed in ideal number of children and, for Korea, the relationship between that ideal and son preference; (2) women's expectations of coresidence with their children in old age; and (3) women's attitudes toward care and support of the elderly parents. Changes in husband-wife relations are assessed by examining: (1) normative imperatives of women's marriage; (2) attitudes toward divorce, (3) types of marriage; and (4) attitudes toward division of labor between the sexes.

### Intergenerational Relations

Table 9 shows changes in the ideal number of children for married women of reproductive age, the data for which were drawn from a series of national opinion surveys on family planning (for Japan) and from various national surveys on fertility and family planning (for Korea). From the table, we notice that preference for large families has declined in both Japan and Korea in postwar years.<sup>14</sup> However, differences between the two countries are also notable. First, Japan's family-size orientation stabilized in the late 1970s in spite of

Table 9. Percentage Distribution of Ideal Number of Children for Married Women of Reproductive Age, Mean Ideal Number of Children, and Total Fertility Rate (TFR): Japan and Korea, 1949-88

|              | Ideal number of children |    |    |    |    | Mean ideal no. of children | TFR   |
|--------------|--------------------------|----|----|----|----|----------------------------|-------|
|              | 0                        | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4+ |                            |       |
| <b>JAPAN</b> |                          |    |    |    |    |                            |       |
| 1949*        | 0                        | 1  | 9  | 50 | 40 | 3.3                        | 3.7** |
| 1963         | 3                        | 2  | 31 | 54 | 10 | 2.7                        | 2.0   |
| 1969         | 1                        | 2  | 33 | 49 | 15 | 2.8                        | 2.1   |
| 1975         | 1                        | 3  | 41 | 43 | 11 | 2.7                        | 1.9   |
| 1979         | 3                        | 3  | 45 | 41 | 9  | 2.5                        | 1.8   |
| 1984         | 1                        | 3  | 44 | 42 | 9  | 2.5                        | 1.8   |
| 1988         | 1                        | 4  | 45 | 42 | 8  | 2.5                        | 1.7   |
| <b>KOREA</b> |                          |    |    |    |    |                            |       |
| 1965         | 0                        | 0  | 4  | 34 | 62 | 3.9                        | 4.9   |
| 1968         | 0                        | 0  | 4  | 36 | 60 | 3.8                        | 4.7   |
| 1971         | 0                        | 0  | 6  | 42 | 52 | 3.7                        | 4.5   |
| 1973         | 0                        | 1  | 20 | 52 | 27 | 3.1                        | 4.0   |
| 1976         | 0                        | 4  | 40 | 37 | 19 | 2.8                        | 3.0   |
| 1982         |                          | 6  | 55 | 31 | 8  | 2.5                        | 2.4   |
| 1985         |                          | 16 | 70 | 11 | 2  | 2.0                        | 1.7   |
| 1988         |                          | 20 | 66 | 10 | 4  | 2.0                        | 1.7   |

NOTE: Figures were recalculated from published tables by excluding the non-response category.

\* Respondents were women aged 20-50.

\*\* The rate for the year 1950.

SOURCES: Population Problems Research Council (1990) Kiroku Nihon no Jinko: Syosan heno Kiseki (Japan's Population: Process to Low Fertility). Tokyo: Mainichi Newspapers; Kokuritsu Yoron Chosasho (1950) Jinko Mondai ni kansuru Yoron Chosa (The 1949 National Opinion Survey on Population); Korea Institute for Population and Health (1989) The 1988 National Fertility and Family Health Survey; \_\_\_\_\_ (1985) The 1985 Fertility and Family Health Survey; Korean Institute for Family Planning (1979) The 1976 National Fertility and Family Planning Education Survey; Moon, Hyun-Sang, Seung-Hyun Han and Soon Choi (1973) Fertility and Family Planning: An Interim Report on 1971 Fertility-Abortion Survey. Seoul: Korean Institute for Family Planning.

the continuing fertility decline; moreover, the level of preference stayed considerably higher than the level of actual fertility, as shown in the ideal number of children remaining at two or three. In Korea, on the other hand, fertility preference shifted in accordance with the actual fertility decline, although the extent of change in preference was less than that in actual fertility. In addition, unlike the situation in Japan, Korea's family-size orientation shows a clear convergence toward the two-child family norm, which was also been observed in the United States (Preston, 1986) and in China (Whyte and Gu, 1987).

Table 10. Percentage of Ever-Married Women Aged 15-44 Who Think It Necessary to Have Son (Male Heir): Korea, 1971, 1985, 1988

| Age group | 1971    |         |       | 1985    |         |         | 1988    |         |         |
|-----------|---------|---------|-------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|           | Total   | Urban   | Rural | Total   | Urban   | Rural   | Total   | Urban   | Rural   |
| Total     | 63      | 53      | 70    | 39      | 33      | 52      | 30      | 25      | 43      |
| 15-24     | --      | --      | --    | 25      | 24      | 26      | 16      | 15      | 18      |
| 25-29     | --      | --      | --    | 28      | 26      | 37      | 23      | 20      | 32      |
| 30-34     | --      | --      | --    | 39      | 36      | 49      | 27      | 23      | 40      |
| 35-39     | --      | --      | --    | 44      | 37      | 64      | 37      | 32      | 53      |
| 40-44     | --      | --      | --    | 58      | 47      | 78      | 45      | 36      | 68      |
| (N)       | (3,557) | (1,183) | (880) | (7,005) | (5,040) | (1,965) | (6,511) | (4,310) | (1,965) |

SOURCES: Korean Institute for Family Planning (1973) Fertility and Family Planning: An Interim Report on 1971 Fertility-Abortion Survey. p.48; Korea Institute for Population and Health (1989) The 1988 National Fertility and Family Health Survey. p.55.

What is especially remarkable in the case of (married) women who expressed their ideal family size to be zero or one child: from only 6 percent in 1982 to 20 percent in 1988. This increase is considered to

be at least partly due to the campaign by the national family planning program to promote the idea of one-child families (Hong and Sŏ, 1987).<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, it becomes even more remarkable when we consider Korea's traditionally strong son preference, which was found to persist during the 1970s (Chung et al., 1977; Lee-Jay Cho et al., 1982: 115-125). Does this mean that strong son preference has finally given way under the pressure of larger socioeconomic and demographic changes? For women the answer is probably yes, judging from the results of various national surveys. As shown in Table 10, in 1971, 63 percent of married Korean women at reproductive ages thought it necessary to have a son (male heir), but the proportion had declined to 39 percent by 1985, and to 30 percent by 1988. Although considerable differences still exist between rural and urban women and between older and younger women, a decline in son preference seems to be clear.

Another declining trend is observed in women's expectations of care and support from their children in old age. A dramatic decline in expectation of old-age dependence on children is indicated by data from a series of national opinion surveys on family planning in Japan; the data reveal that in 1952 around 56 percent of married Japanese women aged 15-49 expected to depend on their children in old age whereas only 15 percent did so in 1990 (Table 11). Although comparable time-series data are not available for Korea, it seems possible that a similar decline has occurred in that country. As shown in Table 12, data from the 1986 National Survey on Family Life Cycle indicate large age differentials in the proportion of married women who expected to coreside with their children in old age. Although we cannot confirm the existence of a trend with single cross-sectional data, to the extent that these age differences capture cohort effects and that coresidence expectation captures expectation toward dependence, a rapid decline in Korean women's expectation of children's care and support in old age seems to be occurring.

Table 11. Percentage of Currently Married Women Aged 15-49 Who Expect to Depend on Their Children in Old Age: Japan, 1952-90

| Year | Percentage |
|------|------------|
| 1952 | 55.8       |
| 1957 | 47.4       |
| 1963 | 33.3       |
| 1969 | 28.6       |
| 1975 | 26.0       |
| 1979 | 24.3       |
| 1984 | 26.1       |
| 1988 | 18.2       |
| 1990 | 14.6       |

SOURCES: Population Problems Research Council (1990) Kiroku Nihon no Jinko: Syosan heno Kiseki (Japan's Population: Process to Low Fertility). Tokyo: Mainichi Newspapers.

Table 12. Percentage of Ever-Married Women Aged 15-64 Who Expect to Coreside with Children in Old Age: Korea, 1986

| Age group | Total   | Urban   | Rural |
|-----------|---------|---------|-------|
| Total     | 29.9    | 25.5    | 39.4  |
| 15-24     | 8.4     | 6.3     | 10.4  |
| 25-29     | 11.5    | 9.6     | 17.7  |
| 30-34     | 16.3    | 15.8    | 17.6  |
| 35-39     | 25.9    | 23.1    | 33.0  |
| 40-44     | 33.7    | 31.5    | 37.8  |
| 45-49     | 42.2    | 35.5    | 54.2  |
| 50-54     | 54.5    | 50.7    | 59.1  |
| 55+       | 65.6    | 64.7    | 66.7  |
| (N)       | (3,013) | (2,047) | (966) |

SOURCE: Unpublished table from the data of the 1986 Family Life Cycle Survey by Korea Institute for Population and Health.

In addition, possible differences between Japan and Korea in normative expectations of "dependence on children" should be noted. According to findings from an international comparative survey in 1981 (Table 13), although similar proportions of Japanese and Korea mothers preferred to live with their children in old age, only 38 percent of the Japanese mothers who expressed such a preference said that they would also like to be cared for by their children whereas the corresponding proportion was over 65 percent among their Korean counterparts. Furthermore, among the Japanese mothers who did not want to live with their children in old age, almost 80 percent did not want to receive financial support from their children either. In contrast, over 40 percent of the Korean mothers said that they would like to have such financial assistance from their children even though they did not want to live with them. These findings imply that, on one hand, Japanese women tend to seek companionship and emotional support, rather than economic support or physical care, from children through coresidence, and on the other, Korean women tend to be much more "pragmatic," expecting care or financial assistance from children and regarding coresidence as a means of having it. This greater tendency for Korean women to expect care and financial assistance from their children than their Japanese counterparts may be due, at least in part, to the fact that in Korea a formal pension system (public or private) is virtually nonexistent, although many large corporations have customarily provided a lump-sum payment upon their employees' retirement.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, as shown in Table 13, similarities between Japanese and Korean mothers' expectations are apparent when they are compared with those of American mothers. A vast majority of American mothers expressed unwillingness to coreside with their children or to receive care or financial support from them, indicating their strong value orientation toward independence.

As discussed above, expectation of old-age dependence on children seems to be dwindling among Japanese and Korean women, though it is still quite a bit higher than in many Western countries. How about attitudes of those women toward their elderly parents? According to the data from a series of national opinion surveys on family planning in Japan (Table 14), the percentage of married women aged 15-49 who think that care and support of the elderly parents are their duty as children does not show an unequivocal, long-term downward trend,

Table 13. Percentage Distribution of Mothers' Preferences Concerning Old-Age Coresidence with Their Children by Age: Results from an International Comparative Survey in 1981: Japan, Korea, and the United States

| Country and age group | Want to coreside       |     |    | Do not want to coreside        |     |    | D/K |
|-----------------------|------------------------|-----|----|--------------------------------|-----|----|-----|
|                       | & want to be cared for |     |    | but want to have econ. support |     |    |     |
|                       | Total                  | Yes | No | Total                          | Yes | No |     |
| <b>JAPAN</b>          |                        |     |    |                                |     |    |     |
| Total                 | 55                     | 21  | 34 | 29                             | 6   | 23 | 16  |
| =39                   | 54                     | 18  | 35 | 29                             | 6   | 23 | 17  |
| 40-49                 | 57                     | 23  | 34 | 28                             | 6   | 22 | 15  |
| 50+                   | 47                     | 25  | 22 | 39                             | 11  | 28 | 14  |
| <b>KOREA</b>          |                        |     |    |                                |     |    |     |
| Total                 | 52                     | 34  | 18 | 42                             | 17  | 25 | 6   |
| =39                   | 49                     | 29  | 19 | 46                             | 14  | 32 | 5   |
| 40-49                 | 53                     | 36  | 16 | 41                             | 19  | 21 | 7   |
| 50+                   | 69                     | 47  | 22 | 27                             | 13  | 14 | 4   |
| <b>UNITED STATES</b>  |                        |     |    |                                |     |    |     |
| Total                 | 8                      | 5   | 3  | 87                             | 8   | 79 | 5   |
| =39                   | 7                      | 4   | 3  | 88                             | 8   | 79 | 5   |
| 40-49                 | 8                      | 5   | 3  | 87                             | 7   | 80 | 5   |
| 50+                   | 9                      | 6   | 3  | 88                             | 15  | 73 | 3   |

NOTE: Mothers included in the survey had children aged 10-15 at the time of survey.

SOURCE: Seishonen Taisaku Honbu, Management and Coordination Agency (1981) Kokusai Hikaku: Nihon no Kodomo to Hahaoya (Japanese Children and Mothers from International Comparative Perspectives).

although a definite decline emerges after the mid-1980s. We could not locate any national data on this issue for Korea, but a 1983-84 survey of unmarried female factory workers aged 15-26 indicates that 87 percent of them thought that parents should be looked after by their children (Korea Institute for Population and Health, 1984: 198). Therefore, although the available evidence is not conclusive, it seems likely that traditional filial piety is still rather strong among women in both Japan and Korea.

Table 14. Percentage of Currently Married Women Aged 15-49 Who Think That Care and Support of Elderly Parents Are a Child's Duty: Japan, 1963-90

| Year | Percentage |
|------|------------|
| 1963 | 38.6       |
| 1967 | 40.3       |
| 1971 | 43.9       |
| 1975 | 47.2       |
| 1979 | 47.2       |
| 1981 | 50.5       |
| 1984 | 53.2       |
| 1986 | 56.5       |
| 1988 | 42.3       |
| 1990 | 34.3       |

SOURCE: Population Problems Research Council (1990) Kiroku Nihon no Jinko: Syosanheno Kiseki (Japan's Population: Process to Low Fertility). Tokyo: Mainichi Newspapers.

## Conjugal Relations

As we have seen, parent-child relationships occupied a far more important position than husband-wife relationships in the traditional family system in Japan and Korea, and both conjugal relationships and women's roles were defined in such a way as to serve the continuation of vertical familial relations: women (and men) must marry in accordance with the decision of the family or head, bear children, and fulfill the dual role of "good wife and wise mother" by keeping themselves in the domestic world. However, we have just found that, exposed to major socioeconomic and demographic changes in the postwar years, many intergenerational relationships underwent rapid transformations, although some did not. Similarly, both change and persistence are likely to characterize attitudes toward conjugal relationships in postwar Japan and Korea. Here, we start our discussion by looking at attitudes toward marriage and divorce.

Table 15 shows changes in the proportion of the Japanese of both sexes who agree with the traditional notion that "women should marry because their happiness lies in marriage." The data are based on a series of national opinion surveys on women by the Japanese government. Interestingly, a question concerning the "necessity" of marriage for men's happiness was never asked in these surveys. From the table, we can see that the sense of "necessity" of marriage for women's happiness was, though weakening, relatively persistent in Japan until very recently. Comparing males with females, we notice that the changes in women's attitudes toward a less traditional view of the importance of marriage to women's happiness have been quicker than those of men. Nevertheless, the speed of attenuation of this normative imperative suddenly accelerated during the past few years, affecting both sexes and all age groups.

For Korea, although exactly comparable data are not available, we can assess the extent of weakening in the normative imperative of marriage for women by putting together evidence from various surveys. The 1983-84 survey of unmarried female factory workers aged 15-26 indicates that only 17 percent of the respondents thought that marriage was a "must" for women, although 38 percent thought it would be better to marry than stay single even though marriage was not a necessity (Korea Institute for Population and Health, 1984: 177). As shown in Table 16, data from the 1989 Survey of Family Roles in Korea indi-

Table 15. Percentage of Persons Who Think that "Women Had Better Marry Because Women's Happiness Lies in Marriage" by Urban-Rural Residence, Sex, and Age: Japan, 1972, 1979, 1987, 1990

| Respondent characteristic | 1972 | 1979 | 1987 | 1990 |
|---------------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Total                     | 39   | 33   | 30   | 15   |
| Residence                 |      |      |      |      |
| Large cities              | --   | --   | 27   | 12   |
| Middle-sized cities       | --   | --   | 27   | 12   |
| Small cities              | --   | --   | 32   | 16   |
| Rural areas               | --   | --   | 36   | 20   |
| Men                       |      |      |      |      |
| Total                     | 36   | 33   | 33   | 16   |
| 20-29                     | --   | --   | 25   | 7    |
| 30-39                     | --   | --   | 26   | 9    |
| 40-49                     | --   | --   | 27   | 11   |
| 50-59                     | --   | --   | 37   | 22   |
| 60-69                     | --   | --   | 44   | 27   |
| 70+                       | --   | --   | 43   | 25   |
| Women                     |      |      |      |      |
| Total                     | 40   | 32   | 28   | 14   |
| 18-19                     | 29   | --   | --   | --   |
| 20-24                     | 36   | --   | 25   | 5    |
| 25-29                     | 38   | --   | 21   | 4    |
| 30-34                     | 39   | --   | 18   | 9    |
| 35-39                     | 38   | --   | 22   | 6    |
| 40-44                     | 38   | --   | 24   | 9    |
| 45-49                     | 43   | --   | 29   | 14   |
| 50-54                     | 42   | --   | 33   | 14   |
| 55-59                     | 43   | --   | 36   | 24   |
| 60-69                     | 48   | --   | 38   | 28   |
| 70+                       | 44   | --   | 41   | 25   |

SOURCES: Prime Minister's Office of Japan (1973) Fujin ni kansuru Ishiki Chosa (National Opinion Survey on Women). Vol. 1; \_\_\_\_\_ (1987) Josei ni kansuru Yoron Chosa (National Opinion Survey on Women); \_\_\_\_\_ (1990) Josei ni kansuru Yoron Chosa.

cate that only 19 percent of married women thought that women must marry, and a much lower proportion (around 8 percent) of younger married women in their twenties and thirties thought so (Kong et al., 1990: 84). Even when we add the proportion of women who thought it "not necessary but better to marry," the total proportion of women expressing positive attitudes toward the "necessity" of women's marriage does not reach the 50 percent mark. To be sure, as reported in the third section, most Japanese and Korean women do marry. Nevertheless, this rapid attitudinal change in the normative primacy of marriage may be a sign of future behavioral changes.

Other evidence of the weakening of traditional attitudes toward marriage is the high level of permissive attitudes toward divorce in Japan and Korea in recent years. Table 17 shows the percentage of people who agreed with the opinion that "it is all right to divorce if a couple does not get along well." The Japanese data are drawn from the government's 1987 National Opinion Survey on Women which included both men and women aged 20 and above; the Korean data are based on the 1989 Survey of Family Roles in Korea which included ever-married women aged 20 and above. Over 60 percent of the Japanese agreed with this normative statement; and young age, women's education, and urban residence are all associated positively with a "flexible" attitude toward divorce. Especially notable are high proportions of Japanese women under age 50 who expressed permissive attitudes toward divorce.

Although the percentage of married Korean women who agreed with the statement that divorce was permissible (42 percent) is lower than that of their Japanese counterparts (60 percent), in Korea as in Japan younger age, higher education, and urban residence are all positively associated with more permissible attitudes toward divorce. Married Korean women in their twenties and thirties exhibit especially high degrees of permissiveness. As mentioned before, under the traditional family system in Japan and Korea, divorce not only imposed economic difficulties on women but also stigmatized them socially; a divorced woman was regarded as a "failure" (Lee-Jay Cho et al., 1982: 88-89; Hardacre, 1984: 119-120; Lebra, 1984: 152-162). Given the traditional normative orientations toward divorce, the permissive attitudes of Japanese and Korean women, especially that of younger ones, again seem to indicate the rapid attenuation of traditional attitudes toward marriage.

Despite the weakening of traditional attitudes toward the institution of marriage, however, the traditional predominance of parent-child relations over conjugal relations can be seen in the persisting importance of children in divorce in these East Asian countries. For example, according to findings from an international comparative survey on children aged 10-15 and their mothers conducted by the Japanese government in 1979 (Seishonen Taisaku Honbu, 1987: 163), 92 percent of Korean mothers and 72 percent of Japanese mothers agreed with the statement that "for the sake of children, parents should not divorce," whereas only 30 percent of American mothers agreed with the statement. Moreover, among the female respondents of the 1989 Korean Family Roles Survey who disagreed with the statement expressing a permissive attitude toward divorce, over 70 percent chose "for the sake of children" as their reason for disagreement (Kong et al., 1990: 87). Therefore, although many characteristics of the ie or jib system are disappearing, some aspects of intergenerational relations appear to remain quite strong in Japan and Korea today.

To examine changes in mate selection and marriage, we next consider marriage types by year of women's marriage in Japan and Korea (Table 18). We find there have been rapid declines in the proportion of arranged marriages in both countries, although the proportion has remained considerably higher in Korea than in Japan (Korea's level for 1980-86 is similar to Japan's level for 1965-69).<sup>17</sup> These findings thus indicate that parental influence on marriage decisions has been weakening in both countries, although it is still substantially stronger in Korea than in Japan. We can also see increases in the proportions of "love matches" (nonarranged marriages), usually starting through a friend's introduction or at the couple's work place or school, indicating increasing individuation in mate selection that is thought to have been facilitated, at least in part, by women's increasing educational attainment and labor force participation prior to marriage.

Table 16. Percentage of Ever Married Women Who Think that Women "Must Marry" or That Marriage Is "Not Necessary But It Is Better to Marry" by Women's Characteristics: Korea, 1989

| Characteristic       | Must marry | Not necessary but better to marry |
|----------------------|------------|-----------------------------------|
| Total                | 18.6       | 27.6                              |
| Residence            |            |                                   |
| Urban                | 14.0       | 27.8                              |
| Rural                | 27.9       | 27.3                              |
| Age                  |            |                                   |
| =29                  | 7.7        | 25.4                              |
| 30-39                | 8.4        | 26.5                              |
| 40-49                | 20.0       | 29.8                              |
| 50-59                | 31.1       | 27.4                              |
| 60+                  | 38.7       | 30.5                              |
| Education            |            |                                   |
| Primary or less      | 28.8       | 28.9                              |
| Secondary            | 9.0        | 26.4                              |
| University or higher | 10.1       | 27.5                              |

SOURCE: Kong, Sekwon, A. Cho, J. Kim, H. Chang and M. Sŏ. (1990) Hanguk Kajok ūi Kinŭng kwa Yŏkhwal Byŏnhwa (Changing Family Role in Korea). Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs.

Finally, we examine both attitudinal and behavioral aspects of the division of labor between the sexes in the home. As we have discussed, in traditional Japan and Korea, marital roles remained strictly segregated along gender lines and normative expectations of the husband as a breadwinner and the wife as a homemaker responsible for caring for children were strong and pervasive. From Table 19, which shows changes over time in the proportion of Japanese agreeing

Table 17. Percentage of Persons Agreeing with the Opinion That "It Is Permissible to Divorce When Marriage Does Not Go Well" by Selected Characteristics: Japan, 1987, and Korea, 1989

| Characteristic         | Japan | Korea |
|------------------------|-------|-------|
| Total                  | 61    | --    |
| Men                    | 61    | --    |
| Women                  | 61    | 42    |
| Residence              |       |       |
| Urban                  | 62    | 47    |
| Rural                  | 58    | 31    |
| Men's age              |       |       |
| 20-29                  | 63    | --    |
| 30-39                  | 68    | --    |
| 40-49                  | 60    | --    |
| 50-59                  | 61    | --    |
| 60-69                  | 53    | --    |
| 70+                    | 51    | --    |
| Women's age            |       |       |
| 20-29                  | 72    | 57    |
| 30-39                  | 66    | 53    |
| 40-49                  | 67    | 38    |
| 50-59                  | 55    | 26    |
| 60-69                  | 50    | 21**  |
| 70+                    | 36    | --    |
| Women's marital status |       |       |
| Never-married          | 73    | --    |
| Married                | 60    | 42    |
| Women's education      |       |       |
| Primary or less        | --*   | 28    |
| Junior high school     | 53    | 54#   |
| High school            | 64    | --    |
| University or higher   | 68    | 62    |

NOTE: The data for Japan were drawn systematically from a sample of men and women aged 20 or above (regardless of their marital status), whereas the data for Korea were drawn systematically from a sample of ever-married women.

\* Included in the category of "junior high school."

\*\* Including women aged 70 or higher.

# Including women with high-school education.

SOURCES: Prime Minister's Office of Japan (1987) Jyosei ni kansuru Yoron Chosa (National Opinion Survey on Women); Kong, Sekwon, A. Cho, J. Kim, H. Chang and M. So. (1990) Hanguk Kajok ui Kinung kwa Yokhwal Kyonhwa (Changing Family Role in Korea). Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs.

Table 18. Percentage Distribution of Marriage Types by Year of Marriage: Japan and Korea

|         | Arranged marriage | Love match initiated by |                       |                       |                   |                   |                   |       |
|---------|-------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------|
|         |                   | Total                   | Friend's introduction | Meeting at work place | Meeting at school | Nextdoor neighbor | Meeting by chance | Other |
| Japan:  |                   |                         |                       |                       |                   |                   |                   |       |
| 1943-47 | 65                | 35                      | --                    | --                    | --                | --                | --                | --    |
| 1948-57 | 57                | 43                      | --                    | --                    | --                | --                | --                | --    |
| 1960-64 | 48                | 52                      | 12                    | 21                    | 2                 | 8                 | 5                 | 4     |
| 1965-69 | 44                | 56                      | 13                    | 26                    | 3                 | 5                 | 5                 | 3     |
| 1970-74 | 34                | 66                      | 15                    | 30                    | 5                 | 5                 | 7                 | 4     |
| 1975-79 | 31                | 69                      | 20                    | 27                    | 5                 | 3                 | 7                 | 6     |
| 1980-84 | 25                | 75                      | 22                    | 32                    | 7                 | 3                 | 7                 | 4     |
| 1985-87 | 23                | 77                      | 21                    | 34                    | 7                 | 1                 | 7                 | 7     |
| Korea:  |                   |                         |                       |                       |                   |                   |                   |       |
| -1939   | 93                | 3                       | --                    | --                    | --                | --                | --                | --    |
| 1940-49 | 96                | 4                       | 0                     | 0                     | 0                 | 2                 | --                | 1     |
| 1950-59 | 89                | 11                      | 5                     | 1                     | 1                 | 3                 | --                | 2     |
| 1960-69 | 81                | 19                      | 9                     | 4                     | 1                 | 2                 | --                | 4     |
| 1970-79 | 55                | 45                      | 20                    | 11                    | 2                 | 5                 | --                | 7     |
| 1980-86 | 45                | 55                      | 26                    | 16                    | 3                 | 3                 | --                | 7     |

NOTE: Figures for Japan were recalculated from the published figure by excluding nonresponse category.

SOURCES: Institute of Population Problems, Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare (1978) Dai Nanaji Syussanryoku Chosa Hokoku (Report of the 7th Fertility Survey of 1977); \_\_\_\_\_ (1983) Dai Hachiji Syussanryoku Chosa: Daiichi Hokokusho (The 8th Fertility Survey of 1982: First Report); \_\_\_\_\_ (1988) Showa 62-nen Nihonjin no Kekkō to Syussan: Dai Kuji Syussanryoku Chosa (Marriage and Fertility of the Japanese: The 9th Fertility Survey of 1987); Kong, Sae Kwon, Inwha Park, Aejo Cho, Jinsook Kim, and Hyunsup Chang (1987) Hanguk Kajok Kujo ui Byonhwa (Changes in Family Structure in Korea). Seoul: Korea Institute for Population and Health.

Table 19. Percentage of Persons Agreeing with the Notion of "the External World for the Husband and the Domestic World for the Wife" by Selected Characteristics: Japan, 1972, 1984, 1987, and 1990

| Characteristic              | 1972 | 1984 | 1987 | 1990 |
|-----------------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Total                       | 83   | 55   | 43   | 29   |
| Men                         |      |      |      |      |
| Total                       | 84   | 63   | 52   | 35   |
| 20-29                       | --   | --   | 41   | 29   |
| 30-39                       | --   | --   | 41   | 29   |
| 40-49                       | --   | --   | 49   | 32   |
| 50-59                       | --   | --   | 57   | 36   |
| 60-69                       | --   | --   | 62   | 39   |
| 70+                         | --   | --   | 73   | 54   |
| Women                       |      |      |      |      |
| Total                       | 83   | 49   | 37   | 25   |
| 18-19                       | 67   | --   | --   | --   |
| 20-24                       | 77   | --   | 23   | 22   |
| 25-29                       | 81   | --   | 30   | 19   |
| 30-34                       | 85   | --   | 22   | 20   |
| 35-39                       | 81   | --   | 26   | 17   |
| 40-44                       | 84   | --   | 35   | 15   |
| 45-49                       | 87   | --   | 31   | 20   |
| 50-54                       | 88   | --   | 43   | 26   |
| 55-59                       | 88   | --   | 46   | 34   |
| 60-69                       | 88   | --   | 57   | 42   |
| 70+                         | 82   | --   | 61   | 48   |
| Women's Occupation          |      |      |      |      |
| Employed                    | 74   | --   | 23   | 27   |
| Professional                | 63   | --   | 20   | 25   |
| White-collar                | 72   | --   | --** | --** |
| Blue-collar                 | 78   | --   | 26   | 30   |
| Agriculture*                | 85   | --   | --#  | --#  |
| Self-employed/family worker | 80   | --   | 46   | 27   |
| Fulltime housewife          | 88   | --   | 41   | 28   |

NOTES: \* Including fishery and forestry.

\*\* Included in the category of "professional."

# Included in the category of "self-employed/family worker."

SOURCES: Prime Minister's Office, Management and Coordination Agency (1973) Fujin ni kansuru Ishiki Chosa (National Opinion Survey on Women). Vol. 1; \_\_\_\_\_ (1987) Josei ni kansuru Yoron Chosa (National Opinion Survey on Women); \_\_\_\_\_ (1990) Josei ni kansuru Yoron Chosa.

with the notion that "the external world is for the husband and the domestic world is for the wife," we can see that the normative orientation toward the division of labor was quite strong during the early 1970s: 83 percent of the respondents (84 percent of males and 83 percent of females) agreeing with the idea. However, this value orientation weakened rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s; and by 1990 only 29 percent of the respondents agreed with the notion. Moreover, whereas sex and age differentials were minor in 1972, they became distinctive during the 1980s. Now, women are less positive than men toward the traditional view of the two sexes' roles, and younger women are the least positive. Interestingly, in 1972 and even in 1987 fulltime housewives and female family workers were more supportive of the traditional view than were women employed outside the home, but by 1990 their attitudes toward traditional sex roles had become similar to or even less positive than those of women employed outside the home.

Although comparable cross-tabulational data are not available for Korea, the country is thought to have undergone a similar attitudinal change, as suggested by results from a series of international comparative opinion surveys of the young adults aged 18-24 (Table 20). The international comparative data also show that Japan and Korea are more similar to each other than to the United States: whereas over 30 percent of the Japanese and Korean youths agreed with the notion of a division of labor along gender lines in 1988, the corresponding proportion was around 19 percent for the U.S. counterpart.

Our analysis has found that an increasing proportion of Japanese and Korean women and men have come to disagree with the traditional value orientation of "the external world for men and the domestic world for women." How are these recent attitudinal changes reflected in the actual division of labor in the home? Quantitative evidence indicates hardly at all. According to Japan's national survey on time use and leisure activities in 1981, males aged 15 and above spent, on the average, only eight minutes per day on housework and childcare, whereas women spent three hours and 23 minutes per day on these activities (Table 21). Although men were likely to spend a little more time on household chores and childcare on weekends, especially on Sundays, women shouldered the vast majority of housekeeping and child-care responsibilities. Those who carried an especially heavy

burden of housework and childcare were women aged 25-59 who did not have a job. It is likely that those women were unable to go out for work because of their heavy household responsibilities. Even women with job spent far longer on housekeeping and childcare than men. More-over, Table 21 shows that the situation changed little between 1981 and 1986 for men or women, regardless of women's work status. In Korea the situation does not seem to be much better than in Japan. For example, a cross-tabulational analysis of a 1990 survey data shows that married men of age 20-60 spent, on the average, 37 minutes per day on household chores and childcare whereas married women of the same age group spent five hours and 10 minutes per day (An et al., 1991: 122).<sup>18</sup>

Table 20. Percentage of Persons Aged 18-24 Agreeing with the Notion of "the External World for Men and the Domestic World for Women": Results from International Comparative Surveys in 1977, 1983, and 1988: Japan, Korea, and the United States

| Year | Japan | Korea | U.S. |
|------|-------|-------|------|
| 1977 | 50.4  | --    | 27.3 |
| 1983 | 44.5  | 41.8  | 18.6 |
| 1988 | 30.6  | 35.6  | 18.5 |

SOURCE: Seishonen Taisaku Honbu, Management and Coordination Agency (1989) Dai Yonkai Sekai Seinen Ishiki Chosa Hokokusho: Sekai-no Seinen tonon Hikaku kara Mita Nihon no Seinen (Report of the 4th Opinion Survey of the Youth in the World: the Japanese Youth from a Global Perspective).

Table 21. Average Time Spent per Day on Housekeeping and Childcare by Sex, Age, and Work Status: Japan, 1981 and 1986 (in hours and minutes)

| Year and characteristic | Weekly average | Weekdays | Saturdays | Sundays |
|-------------------------|----------------|----------|-----------|---------|
| 1981                    |                |          |           |         |
| MALES                   | 0.08           | 0.07     | 0.09      | 0.16    |
| 15-19                   | 0.02           | 0.02     | 0.02      | 0.06    |
| 20-24                   | 0.05           | 0.03     | 0.06      | 0.11    |
| 25-29                   | 0.06           | 0.03     | 0.08      | 0.16    |
| 30-39                   | 0.07           | 0.04     | 0.10      | 0.19    |
| 40-49                   | 0.07           | 0.05     | 0.08      | 0.15    |
| 50-59                   | 0.09           | 0.07     | 0.08      | 0.17    |
| 60-64                   | 0.18           | 0.17     | 0.18      | 0.20    |
| 65-69                   | 0.21           | 0.22     | 0.17      | 0.21    |
| 70+                     | 0.20           | 0.20     | 0.21      | 0.18    |
| FEMALES                 | 3.23           | 3.24     | 3.24      | 3.17    |
| 15-19                   | 0.26           | 0.22     | 0.26      | 0.47    |
| 20-24                   | 1.38           | 1.35     | 1.45      | 1.47    |
| 25-29                   | 4.33           | 4.36     | 4.35      | 4.14    |
| 30-39                   | 4.35           | 4.38     | 4.37      | 4.14    |
| 40-49                   | 3.51           | 3.50     | 3.51      | 3.57    |
| 50-59                   | 3.47           | 3.48     | 3.44      | 3.44    |
| 60-64                   | 3.33           | 3.37     | 3.39      | 3.11    |
| 65-69                   | 3.04           | 3.06     | 3.09      | 2.51    |
| 70+                     | 2.03           | 2.05     | 2.04      | 1.54    |
| With a job              | 2.36           | 2.32     | 2.38      | 2.59    |
| 15-19                   | 0.25           | 0.22     | 0.23      | 0.45    |
| 20-24                   | 0.51           | 0.44     | 0.58      | 1.21    |
| 25-29                   | 2.36           | 2.30     | 2.40      | 3.07    |
| 30-39                   | 3.18           | 3.13     | 3.23      | 3.39    |
| 40-49                   | 3.05           | 2.59     | 3.05      | 3.33    |
| 50-59                   | 2.44           | 2.39     | 2.42      | 3.09    |
| 60-64                   | 2.31           | 2.30     | 2.29      | 2.38    |
| 65-69                   | 2.16           | 2.17     | 2.11      | 2.16    |
| 70+                     | 1.49           | 1.48     | 1.47      | 1.55    |
| Without a job           | 4.12           | 4.19     | 4.14      | 3.36    |
| 15-19                   | 0.26           | 0.22     | 0.27      | 0.48    |
| 20-24                   | 3.37           | 3.40     | 3.59      | 2.57    |
| 25-29                   | 6.47           | 7.06     | 6.36      | 5.25    |
| 30-39                   | 6.16           | 6.31     | 6.18      | 4.57    |
| 40-49                   | 5.34           | 5.43     | 5.37      | 4.45    |
| 50-59                   | 5.20           | 5.29     | 5.13      | 4.38    |
| 60-64                   | 4.22           | 4.29     | 4.34      | 3.39    |
| 65-69                   | 3.30           | 2.32     | 3.40      | 3.08    |
| 70+                     | 2.06           | 2.08     | 2.07      | 1.54    |

Table 21--Continued

| Year and characteristic | Weekly average | Weekdays | Saturdays | Sundays |
|-------------------------|----------------|----------|-----------|---------|
| 1986                    |                |          |           |         |
| MALES                   | 0.11           | 0.09     | 0.13      | 0.22    |
| 15-19                   | 0.03           | 0.03     | 0.04      | 0.06    |
| 20-24                   | 0.04           | 0.04     | 0.06      | 0.09    |
| 25-29                   | 0.07           | 0.05     | 0.09      | 0.19    |
| 30-39                   | 0.12           | 0.07     | 0.14      | 0.34    |
| 40-49                   | 0.09           | 0.06     | 0.10      | 0.24    |
| 50-59                   | 0.11           | 0.09     | 0.12      | 0.22    |
| 60-64                   | 0.21           | 0.21     | 0.24      | 0.25    |
| 65-69                   | 0.28           | 0.30     | 0.23      | 0.26    |
| 70+                     | 0.27           | 0.27     | 0.28      | 0.28    |
| FEMALES                 | 3.28           | 3.27     | 3.30      | 3.28    |
| 15-19                   | 0.21           | 0.19     | 0.22      | 0.34    |
| 20-24                   | 1.27           | 1.26     | 1.24      | 1.36    |
| 25-29                   | 3.55           | 4.38     | 4.34      | 3.16    |
| 30-39                   | 4.57           | 4.57     | 5.00      | 4.53    |
| 40-49                   | 4.01           | 3.57     | 4.03      | 4.12    |
| 50-59                   | 3.55           | 3.53     | 4.00      | 3.59    |
| 60-64                   | 3.49           | 3.49     | 3.53      | 3.37    |
| 65-69                   | 3.24           | 3.27     | 3.22      | 3.09    |
| 70+                     | 2.18           | 2.20     | 2.18      | 2.07    |
| With a job              | 2.44           | 2.38     | 2.45      | 3.18    |
| 15-19                   | 0.19           | 0.17     | 0.20      | 0.32    |
| 20-24                   | 0.44           | 0.39     | 0.42      | 1.10    |
| 25-29                   | 2.26           | 2.17     | 2.32      | 3.00    |
| 30-39                   | 3.36           | 3.27     | 3.40      | 4.16    |
| 40-49                   | 3.19           | 3.11     | 3.21      | 3.53    |
| 50-59                   | 2.58           | 2.51     | 2.59      | 3.27    |
| 60-64                   | 2.42           | 2.40     | 2.42      | 2.55    |
| 65-69                   | 2.23           | 2.19     | 2.29      | 2.35    |
| 70+                     | 2.14           | 2.13     | 2.20      | 2.13    |
| Without a job           | 4.16           | 4.23     | 4.17      | 3.44    |
| 15-19                   | 0.22           | 0.19     | 0.22      | 0.36    |
| 20-24                   | 3.40           | 3.49     | 3.40      | 3.02    |
| 25-29                   | 7.15           | 7.35     | 7.03      | 5.49    |
| 30-39                   | 6.57           | 7.09     | 6.54      | 5.51    |
| 40-49                   | 5.49           | 5.58     | 5.56      | 5.02    |
| 50-59                   | 5.22           | 5.29     | 5.26      | 4.45    |
| 60-64                   | 4.38           | 4.44     | 4.48      | 4.10    |
| 65-69                   | 3.53           | 4.00     | 3.48      | 3.26    |
| 70+                     | 2.18           | 2.21     | 2.18      | 2.06    |

SOURCES: Statistics Office, Prime Minister's Office, Japan (1983) The Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities 1981: Whole Japan;  
Statistics Office, Management and Coordination Agency (1988) The Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities 1986: Whole Japan.

## VI. Summary and Discussions

Intrafamilial relations and women's roles in Japan and Korea have undergone various changes since World War II under rapid demographic transition, social structural changes such as urbanization and industrialization, and consequent increases in women's education and labor force participation. Our findings show that in many ways traditional value orientations toward the family and women's subordinate roles have been attenuated, and the position of women in Japan and Korea today can be said to have improved since the prewar years.

In both countries the value of a large family appears to have become very weak, if it still exists. Traditionally strong son preference in Korea, which compelled Korean women to bear at least one son also seems to have lessened in recent years. The tendency for married women to expect to depend on their children in old age has diminished substantially. A normative imperative that women marry, which remained strong for a long time, weakened quickly during the late 1980s. Concomitantly, permissiveness toward divorce appears to have been increasing rapidly in recent years, especially among younger Japanese and Korean women. Although most women in Japan and Korea do marry, these recent attitudinal changes may be a sign of future behavioral changes. Parental involvement in mate selection also seems to have been greatly attenuated in the two countries, whereas increasing individuation in mate selection has been facilitated by the expansion of opportunities for unmarried men and women to interact with each other. Those opportunities are thought to be due at least partly to increases in women's education and labor force participation before marriage. Moreover, a traditional normative orientation toward "women's proper conjugal roles" as expressed in the notion of a division of labor along gender lines weakened rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s.

However, persistence of the traditional familial and gender norms are seen in a still relatively strong notion of filial piety, as measured by married women's sense of duty concerning care and support of elderly parents, and in the importance attached to children in the case of possible divorce (strong support being shown for the opinion that parents should not divorce for the sake of their children). Moreover, despite the weakening of a normative orientation in favor of

a strict division of labor between the sexes, quantitative evidence indicates that women in Japan and Korea today still perform nearly all of the housework and childcare even when the women work outside the home. Women without outside employment shoulder an even heavier burden in household chores and childcare than do those in the labor force.

In conclusion, women in Japan and Korea today are certainly better off than were women in those countries 50 years ago. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to overestimate the degree of improvement in the position of women in the Japanese and Korean societies despite the dramatic changes in some aspects of intrafamilial relations during the past half a decade that we have documented in this study. Since most Japanese and Koreans still regard the family as the fundamental unit of society on which their future depends, it is essential that both men and women seek ways to achieve compatibility between their family lives and their work and other activities outside the home. It remains to be seen how this adjustment, not only in attitudes but also in behavior, will be realized in Japan and Korea.

## Notes

1. During the Koryo period (918-1392) that preceded the Yi dynasty and even during the early period of the Yi dynasty, the institution of marriage and the family was very different from that defined as "traditional" in this paper. For details, see Choi (1970), Deuchler (1977), Chu-Su Kim (1981), Pak (1981), Wagner (1983), and Martin (1990). Similarly, the "traditional" ie system in Japan was the system dominant mainly among the samurai of the Tokugawa shogunate, whereas the institution of marriage and the family among the commoner counterpart was quite different. Details are given by Kawashima (1950) and Aoyama (1978: 39-47). Since these papers are written in Japanese, any interested readers of English are advised to contact the first author for more information.
2. According to Taeuber (1958: 100), adoption of the ie institution during the Meiji Restoration was not smooth. In the discussion of the prewar civil code that preceded its final enactment, some leaders argued for the elimination of the institution as a feudal relic from the Tokugawa Era, saying it was unsuitable for a "modern state." Others defended the institution as basic to loyalty, filial piety, and national policy. Consequently, several revisions of the code was made, but the ie system was nevertheless accepted and even strengthened.
3. The Japanese ie and (the Korean jib) may have been an affectional group; it almost had to be so if it was to continue to be a viable social institution. However, its essential characteristic was the formal structure that dictated the way of life of individual family members for the continuity and welfare of the family as a whole.
4. By "marriage," we refer to both legal and common-law marriage. In traditional Japan and Korea, socially accepted marriages were not necessarily "legal." In Japan, legalizing a marriage involved making an entry into the koseki (family register) of the husband, and it often did not occur until the wife bore a child, thus

proving that she was fecund and able to continue the family line. In Korea, legality of marriage was primarily the concern of the yangban class owing to the importance attached to the legitimacy of an heir. It is thought that among commoners the legality of marriage was less important and marriage and divorce were performed mostly according to social or folklore customs. For details, see Taeuber (1958: 207-209) and Lee-Jay Cho et al. (1982).

5. However, when a wife's position in her husband's family had become strong after some years of marriage, divorcing her was discouraged and difficult to achieve in actuality. According to Taeuber (1958: 208), divorce was no longer appropriate in Japan after the wife had mourned for her parents-in-law and had helped her husband to develop his property. Similarly, in Korea, Yi dynasty law postulated that a woman should not be divorced or deserted if she had completed two years of mourning for her parents-in-law, she had married in poverty and achieved prosperity, or she had no place to go (Lee, 1978: 116; Chu-Su Kim, 1981).
6. Interestingly, in Korea, the proverb is "wise mother and good wife (hyŏnmo yangch'ŏ)" instead of "good wife and wise mother (ryosai kenbo)."
7. According to Lebra (1984: 142), the value orientations that prevailed in prewar Japan required that a virtuous daughter-in-law be a hard worker. Many mothers-in-law assumed an exemplary role by being compulsive workers themselves and demanding that their daughters-in-law work as hard as they did. Similarly, Lee (1989: 409) reports that the bride in traditional Korea had to perform, in addition to assistance in farming, most household chores, including laundering, cooking, and sewing; for this reason, she was expected to get up in the morning before anyone else and to go to bed after everyone else.
8. Taeuber (1958: 102-103) provides a detailed English translation of the new constitution and the revised civil code in Japan.

9. There seem to be two conflicting views about the influences of the Japanese occupation on the Korean family system. According to Pak (1981: 5-6), the traditional Confucian family system was strengthened and supplemented; but Chu-Su Kim (1981) argues that during the occupation, Korean women began to be granted certain, though limited, rights. For details, see their papers listed in the references.
10. For details of the Korean family law (the most recent revision of which became effective as of 1 January 1991), contact the authors.
11. The overall pace of urbanization slowed considerably in Japan during the 1970s, but the early 1980s witnessed a renewed population concentration in the metropolitan node of Tokyo, in contrast to the virtual stopping of population influx into the other two major metropolitan regions (Tsuya and Kuroda, 1989).
12. The dominant type of household actually prevailing in traditional Japan was the nuclear family: as indicated by the 1920 census, the proportion of nuclear households among total ordinary households was 54 percent (*Institute of Population Problems*, 1990: 76). Although specific data are not available, it is also claimed to be the case in traditional Korea (Lee and Kwon, 1968 in Lee-Jay Cho et al., 1982: 94).
13. Detailed data on changes in the percentage distribution of households by household type in Japan and Korea are available from the first author.
14. In these decreases in ideal or preferred level of fertility, little age differential is observed. That is, when the ideal number of children declined, the decline occurred in all age groups of women, indicating the pervasiveness of the changes in family-size preferences.
15. In 1982 the Korean government made a decision to control the population growth rate at the level of 1 percent per year so that

the population in 2023 would not exceed 52,570,000. For this goal, the national family program started a campaign to increase the proportion of families (women) with only one child, adopting as its slogan "Even two are too many." For details, see Hong and Sō (1987).

16. The 1986 National Survey on Family Life Cycle by the Korea Institute for Population and Health asked ever-married women aged 15-64 the following question about their (and their husbands') financial preparation for old age: "What kind of financial plan do you (and your husband) have for your old age?" Eighty-seven percent of the respondents indicated that they had "no specific financial plan," and only about 12 percent had some form of savings, insurance or retirement benefits. The percentage of those without any financial preparation was 94 percent among rural respondents and 85 percent among their urban counterparts.
17. In present-day Japan and Korea, an arranged marriage is not strictly the type of marriage prevalent under the prewar ie or jib system, in which parents (especially the father who was the family head) exerted absolute control over mate selection of young women and men. Rather, it now commonly means a marriage in which the first formal introduction is arranged by parents or senior relatives. Nevertheless, the arranged marriage is a traditional form of initiating a process toward marriage in Japan and Korea.
18. Even in the United States, where men's share of housework and childcare time increased substantially between 1965 and 1975 owing to changes in women's labor force participation patterns (Coverman and Sheley, 1986), women still performed around 80 percent of all the housework and childcare in the mid-1970s (Berardo et al., 1987).

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