回 | 項目 | 内容 |
第1回 | Modeling competitive situations | The payoff matrix, the game tree, and the payoffs. |
第2回 | The game tree | Formal treatment of game trees. Definitions concerning games in extensive form. |
第3回 | Games in strategic forms | Definitions concerning game in strategic form. |
第4回 | Notions of strategies | Formal treatment of strategies, including mixed strategies. |
第5回 | Solution concepts for games: Introduction | Introductory remarks on the solution concepts in games. |
第6回 | Dominance and iterated dominance | Theory and applications of dominance and iterated dominance. |
第7回 | Backward induction | Backward induction in games of complete and perfect information. |
第8回 | Nash equilibrium | Definition and interpretations of Nash equilibrium. |
第9回 | Equilibria in mixed strategies | Theory and applications of equilibria in mixed strategies. |
第10回 | Economic applications I | Game theoretic analyses of product differentiation and provision of public goods |
第11回 | Subgame perfect equilibrium | Theory and applications of subgame perfect equilibrium, and its relation to iterated dominance. |
第12回 | Sequential equilibrium I | The ideas behind sequential equilibrium. |
第13回 | Sequential equilibrium II | Formalities on sequential equilibrium. |
第14回 | Economic applications II | Game theoretic analyses of classic duopoly models. |
第15回 | Exercise | Solving exercises. |