| 回 | 項目 | 内容 |
| 第1回 | Economic application IA | Game theoretic analysis of entry deterrence. |
| 第2回 | Economic application IB | Further investigations into game theoretic analysis of entry deterrence. |
| 第3回 | Modeling irrationality | Further investigations into games with incomplete information. |
| 第4回 | Refinements of sequential equilibria | Investigations into refinements of sequential equilibria. |
| 第5回 | Repeated game with perfect monitoring A | Repeated prisoner's dilemma and the folk theorem under perfect monitoring. |
| 第6回 | Repeated game with perfect monitoring B | Further investigations into the folk theorem under perfect monitoring. |
| 第7回 | Repeated game with imperfect monitoring: the basics | Introduction to the repeated game with imperfect monitoring. |
| 第8回 | Repeated game with imperfect monitoring: Economic application | Game theoretic analysis of implicit collusion in oligopoly. |
| 第9回 | Reputation building: the basics | Introduction to reputation models. |
| 第10回 | Reputation building: Economic application | Game theoretic analysis of reputation building: the chain store game with incomplete information. |
| 第11回 | Bargaining models | Introduction to game theoretic analyses on bargaining. |
| 第12回 | Bargaining with alternating offers | Game theoretic analysis of Bargaining with alternating offers. |
| 第13回 | Current topics in game theory | A quick survey of current game theoretic literature. |
| 第14回 | Discussion | Presentation and discussion on students' term paper. |
| 第15回 | Discussion | Presentation and discussion on students' term paper. |