回 | 項目 | 内容 |
第1回 | Economic application IA | Game theoretic analysis of entry deterrence. |
第2回 | Economic application IB | Further investigations into game theoretic analysis of entry deterrence. |
第3回 | Modeling irrationality | Further investigations into games with incomplete information. |
第4回 | Refinements of sequential equilibria | Investigations into refinements of sequential equilibria. |
第5回 | Repeated game with perfect monitoring A | Repeated prisoner's dilemma and the folk theorem under perfect monitoring. |
第6回 | Repeated game with perfect monitoring B | Further investigations into the folk theorem under perfect monitoring. |
第7回 | Repeated game with imperfect monitoring: the basics | Introduction to the repeated game with imperfect monitoring. |
第8回 | Repeated game with imperfect monitoring: Economic application | Game theoretic analysis of implicit collusion in oligopoly. |
第9回 | Reputation building: the basics | Introduction to reputation models. |
第10回 | Reputation building: Economic application | Game theoretic analysis of reputation building: the chain store game with incomplete information. |
第11回 | Bargaining models | Introduction to game theoretic analyses on bargaining. |
第12回 | Bargaining with alternating offers | Game theoretic analysis of Bargaining with alternating offers. |
第13回 | Current topics in game theory | A quick survey of current game theoretic literature. |
第14回 | Discussion | Presentation and discussion on students' term paper. |
第15回 | Discussion | Presentation and discussion on students' term paper. |